Metaphysics
By Aristotle
Written 350 B.C.E
Translated by W. D. Ross
Part 1
"THE investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another
easy. An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able to
attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, we do not collectively
fail, but every one says something true about the nature of things, and
while individually we contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the
union of all a considerable amount is amassed. Therefore, since the truth
seems to be like the proverbial door, which no one can fail to hit, in
this respect it must be easy, but the fact that we can have a whole truth
and not the particular part we aim at shows the difficulty of it.
"Perhaps,
too, as difficulties are of two kinds, the cause of the present difficulty
is not in the facts but in us. For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze
of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature
most evident of all.
"It is just that we should be grateful, not
only to those with whose views we may agree, but also to those who have
expressed more superficial views; for these also contributed something,
by developing before us the powers of thought. It is true that if there
had been no Timotheus we should have been without much of our lyric poetry;
but if there had been no Phrynis there would have been no Timotheus. The
same holds good of those who have expressed views about the truth; for
from some thinkers we have inherited certain opinions, while the others
have been responsible for the appearance of the former.
"It is
right also that philosophy should be called knowledge of the truth. For
the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge
is action (for even if they consider how things are, practical men do not
study the eternal, but what is relative and in the present). Now we do
not know a truth without its cause; and a thing has a quality in a higher
degree than other things if in virtue of it the similar quality belongs
to the other things as well (e.g. fire is the hottest of things; for it
is the cause of the heat of all other things); so that that causes derivative
truths to be true is most true. Hence the principles of eternal things
must be always most true (for they are not merely sometimes true, nor is
there any cause of their being, but they themselves are the cause of the
being of other things), so that as each thing is in respect of being, so
is it in respect of truth.
Part 2
"
"But evidently there is a first principle, and the causes of things
are neither an infinite series nor infinitely various in kind. For neither
can one thing proceed from another, as from matter, ad infinitum (e.g.
flesh from earth, earth from air, air from fire, and so on without stopping),
nor can the sources of movement form an endless series (man for instance
being acted on by air, air by the sun, the sun by Strife, and so on without
limit). Similarly the final causes cannot go on ad infinitum,-walking being
for the sake of health, this for the sake of happiness, happiness for the
sake of something else, and so one thing always for the sake of another.
And the case of the essence is similar. For in the case of intermediates,
which have a last term and a term prior to them, the prior must be the
cause of the later terms. For if we had to say which of the three is the
cause, we should say the first; surely not the last, for the final term
is the cause of none; nor even the intermediate, for it is the cause only
of one. (It makes no difference whether there is one intermediate or more,
nor whether they are infinite or finite in number.) But of series which
are infinite in this way, and of the infinite in general, all the parts
down to that now present are alike intermediates; so that if there is no
first there is no cause at all.
"Nor can there be an infinite process
downwards, with a beginning in the upward direction, so that water should
proceed from fire, earth from water, and so always some other kind should
be produced. For one thing comes from another in two ways-not in the sense
in which 'from' means 'after' (as we say 'from the Isthmian games come
the Olympian'), but either (i) as the man comes from the boy, by the boy's
changing, or (ii) as air comes from water. By 'as the man comes from the
boy' we mean 'as that which has come to be from that which is coming to
be' or 'as that which is finished from that which is being achieved' (for
as becoming is between being and not being, so that which is becoming is
always between that which is and that which is not; for the learner is
a man of science in the making, and this is what is meant when we say that
from a learner a man of science is being made); on the other hand, coming
from another thing as water comes from air implies the destruction of the
other thing. This is why changes of the former kind are not reversible,
and the boy does not come from the man (for it is not that which comes
to be something that comes to be as a result of coming to be, but that
which exists after the coming to be; for it is thus that the day, too,
comes from the morning-in the sense that it comes after the morning; which
is the reason why the morning cannot come from the day); but changes of
the other kind are reversible. But in both cases it is impossible that
the number of terms should be infinite. For terms of the former kind, being
intermediates, must have an end, and terms of the latter kind change back
into one another, for the destruction of either is the generation of the
other.
"At the same time it is impossible that the first cause,
being eternal, should be destroyed; for since the process of becoming is
not infinite in the upward direction, that which is the first thing by
whose destruction something came to be must be non-eternal.
"Further,
the final cause is an end, and that sort of end which is not for the sake
of something else, but for whose sake everything else is; so that if there
is to be a last term of this sort, the process will not be infinite; but
if there is no such term, there will be no final cause, but those who maintain
the infinite series eliminate the Good without knowing it (yet no one would
try to do anything if he were not going to come to a limit); nor would
there be reason in the world; the reasonable man, at least, always acts
for a purpose, and this is a limit; for the end is a limit.
"But
the essence, also, cannot be reduced to another definition which is fuller
in expression. For the original definition is always more of a definition,
and not the later one; and in a series in which the first term has not
the required character, the next has not it either. Further, those who
speak thus destroy science; for it is not possible to have this till one
comes to the unanalysable terms. And knowledge becomes impossible; for
how can one apprehend things that are infinite in this way? For this is
not like the case of the line, to whose divisibility there is no stop,
but which we cannot think if we do not make a stop (for which reason one
who is tracing the infinitely divisible line cannot be counting the possibilities
of section), but the whole line also must be apprehended by something in
us that does not move from part to part.-Again, nothing infinite can exist;
and if it could, at least the notion of infinity is not infinite.
"But
if the kinds of causes had been infinite in number, then also knowledge
would have been impossible; for we think we know, only when we have ascertained
the causes, that but that which is infinite by addition cannot be gone
through in a finite time.
Part 3
"
"The effect which lectures produce on a hearer depends on his habits;
for we demand the language we are accustomed to, and that which is different
from this seems not in keeping but somewhat unintelligible and foreign
because of its unwontedness. For it is the customary that is intelligible.
The force of habit is shown by the laws, in which the legendary and childish
elements prevail over our knowledge about them, owing to habit. Thus some
people do not listen to a speaker unless he speaks mathematically, others
unless he gives instances, while others expect him to cite a poet as witness.
And some want to have everything done accurately, while others are annoyed
by accuracy, either because they cannot follow the connexion of thought
or because they regard it as pettifoggery. For accuracy has something of
this character, so that as in trade so in argument some people think it
mean. Hence one must be already trained to know how to take each sort of
argument, since it is absurd to seek at the same time knowledge and the
way of attaining knowledge; and it is not easy to get even one of the two.
"The minute accuracy of mathematics is not to be demanded in all
cases, but only in the case of things which have no matter. Hence method
is not that of natural science; for presumably the whole of nature has
matter. Hence we must inquire first what nature is: for thus we shall also
see what natural science treats of (and whether it belongs to one science
or to more to investigate the causes and the principles of
things).
Chicago-North Shore Therapy.com
|
|
