Metaphysics
By Aristotle
Written 350 B.C.E
Translated by W. D. Ross
Part 1
"WE must reckon up the results arising from what has been said,
and compute the sum of them, and put the finishing touch to our inquiry.
We have said that the causes, principles, and elements of substances are
the object of our search. And some substances are recognized by every one,
but some have been advocated by particular schools. Those generally recognized
are the natural substances, i.e. fire, earth, water, air, &c., the simple
bodies; second plants and their parts, and animals and the parts of animals;
and finally the physical universe and its parts; while some particular
schools say that Forms and the objects of mathematics are substances. But
there are arguments which lead to the conclusion that there are other substances,
the essence and the substratum. Again, in another way the genus seems more
substantial than the various spccies, and the universal than the particulars.
And with the universal and the genus the Ideas are connected; it is in
virtue of the same argument that they are thought to be substances. And
since the essence is substance, and the definition is a formula of the
essence, for this reason we have discussed definition and essential predication.
Since the definition is a formula, and a formula has parts, we had to consider
also with respect to the notion of 'part', what are parts of the substance
and what are not, and whether the parts of the substance are also parts
of the definition. Further, too, neither the universal nor the genus is
a substance; we must inquire later into the Ideas and the objects of mathematics;
for some say these are substances as well as the sensible substances.
"But
now let us resume the discussion of the generally recognized substances.
These are the sensible substances, and sensible substances all have matter.
The substratum is substance, and this is in one sense the matter (and by
matter I mean that which, not being a 'this' actually, is potentially a
'this'), and in another sense the formula or shape (that which being a
'this' can be separately formulated), and thirdly the complex of these
two, which alone is generated and destroyed, and is, without qualification,
capable of separate existence; for of substances completely expressible
in a formula some are separable and some are separable and some are not.
"But clearly matter also is substance; for in all the opposite
changes that occur there is something which underlies the changes, e.g.
in respect of place that which is now here and again elsewhere, and in
respect of increase that which is now of one size and again less or greater,
and in respect of alteration that which is now healthy and again diseased;
and similarly in respect of substance there is something that is now being
generated and again being destroyed, and now underlies the process as a
'this' and again underlies it in respect of a privation of positive character.
And in this change the others are involved. But in either one or two of
the others this is not involved; for it is not necessary if a thing has
matter for change of place that it should also have matter for generation
and destruction.
"The difference between becoming in the full sense
and becoming in a qualified sense has been stated in our physical
works.
Part 2
"
"Since the substance which exists as underlying and as matter is
generally recognized, and this that which exists potentially, it remains
for us to say what is the substance, in the sense of actuality, of sensible
things. Democritus seems to think there are three kinds of difference between
things; the underlying body, the matter, is one and the same, but they
differ either in rhythm, i.e. shape, or in turning, i.e. position, or in
inter-contact, i.e. order. But evidently there are many differences; for
instance, some things are characterized by the mode of composition of their
matter, e.g. the things formed by blending, such as honey-water; and others
by being bound together, e.g. bundle; and others by being glued together,
e.g. a book; and others by being nailed together, e.g. a casket; and others
in more than one of these ways; and others by position, e.g. threshold
and lintel (for these differ by being placed in a certain way); and others
by time, e.g. dinner and breakfast; and others by place, e.g. the winds;
and others by the affections proper to sensible things, e.g. hardness and
softness, density and rarity, dryness and wetness; and some things by some
of these qualities, others by them all, and in general some by excess and
some by defect. Clearly, then, the word 'is' has just as many meanings;
a thing is a threshold because it lies in such and such a position, and
its being means its lying in that position, while being ice means having
been solidified in such and such a way. And the being of some things will
be defined by all these qualities, because some parts of them are mixed,
others are blended, others are bound together, others are solidified, and
others use the other differentiae; e.g. the hand or the foot requires such
complex definition. We must grasp, then, the kinds of differentiae (for
these will be the principles of the being of things), e.g. the things characterized
by the more and the less, or by the dense and the rare, and by other such
qualities; for all these are forms of excess and defect. And anything that
is characterized by shape or by smoothness and roughness is characterized
by the straight and the curved. And for other things their being will mean
their being mixed, and their not being will mean the opposite.
"It
is clear, then, from these facts that, since its substance is the cause
of each thing's being, we must seek in these differentiae what is the cause
of the being of each of these things. Now none of these differentiae is
substance, even when coupled with matter, yet it is what is analogous to
substance in each case; and as in substances that which is predicated of
the matter is the actuality itself, in all other definitions also it is
what most resembles full actuality. E.g. if we had to define a threshold,
we should say 'wood or stone in such and such a position', and a house
we should define as 'bricks and timbers in such and such a position',(or
a purpose may exist as well in some cases), and if we had to define ice
we should say 'water frozen or solidified in such and such a way', and
harmony is 'such and such a blending of high and low'; and similarly in
all other cases.
"Obviously, then, the actuality or the formula
is different when the matter is different; for in some cases it is the
composition, in others the mixing, and in others some other of the attributes
we have named. And so, of the people who go in for defining, those who
define a house as stones, bricks, and timbers are speaking of the potential
house, for these are the matter; but those who propose 'a receptacle to
shelter chattels and living beings', or something of the sort, speak of
the actuality. Those who combine both of these speak of the third kind
of substance, which is composed of matter and form (for the formula that
gives the differentiae seems to be an account of the form or actuality,
while that which gives the components is rather an account of the matter);
and the same is true of the kind of definitions which Archytas used to
accept; they are accounts of the combined form and matter. E.g. what is
still weather? Absence of motion in a large expanse of air; air is the
matter, and absence of motion is the actuality and substance. What is a
calm? Smoothness of sea; the material substratum is the sea, and the actuality
or shape is smoothness. It is obvious then, from what has been said, what
sensible substance is and how it exists-one kind of it as matter, another
as form or actuality, while the third kind is that which is composed of
these two.
Part 3
"
"We must not fail to notice that sometimes it is not clear whether
a name means the composite substance, or the actuality or form, e.g. whether
'house' is a sign for the composite thing, 'a covering consisting of bricks
and stones laid thus and thus', or for the actuality or form, 'a covering',
and whether a line is 'twoness in length' or 'twoness', and whether an
animal is soul in a body' or 'a soul'; for soul is the substance or actuality
of some body. 'Animal' might even be applied to both, not as something
definable by one formula, but as related to a single thing. But this question,
while important for another purpose, is of no importance for the inquiry
into sensible substance; for the essence certainly attaches to the form
and the actuality. For 'soul' and 'to be soul' are the same, but 'to be
man' and 'man' are not the same, unless even the bare soul is to be called
man; and thus on one interpretation the thing is the same as its essence,
and on another it is not.
"If we examine we find that the syllable
does not consist of the letters + juxtaposition, nor is the house bricks
+ juxtaposition. And this is right; for the juxtaposition or mixing does
not consist of those things of which it is the juxtaposition or mixing.
And the same is true in all other cases; e.g. if the threshold is characterized
by its position, the position is not constituted by the threshold, but
rather the latter is constituted by the former. Nor is man animal + biped,
but there must be something besides these, if these are matter,-something
which is neither an element in the whole nor a compound, but is the substance;
but this people eliminate, and state only the matter. If, then, this is
the cause of the thing's being, and if the cause of its being is its substance,
they will not be stating the substance itself.
"(This, then, must
either be eternal or it must be destructible without being ever in course
of being destroyed, and must have come to be without ever being in course
of coming to be. But it has been proved and explained elsewhere that no
one makes or begets the form, but it is the individual that is made, i.e.
the complex of form and matter that is generated. Whether the substances
of destructible things can exist apart, is not yet at all clear; except
that obviously this is impossible in some cases-in the case of things which
cannot exist apart from the individual instances, e.g. house or utensil.
Perhaps, indeed, neither these things themselves, nor any of the other
things which are not formed by nature, are substances at all; for one might
say that the nature in natural objects is the only substance to be found
in destructible things.)
"Therefore the difficulty which used to
be raised by the school of Antisthenes and other such uneducated people
has a certain timeliness. They said that the 'what' cannot be defined (for
the definition so called is a 'long rigmarole') but of what sort a thing,
e.g. silver, is, they thought it possible actually to explain, not saying
what it is, but that it is like tin. Therefore one kind of substance can
be defined and formulated, i.e. the composite kind, whether it be perceptible
or intelligible; but the primary parts of which this consists cannot be
defined, since a definitory formula predicates something of something,
and one part of the definition must play the part of matter and the other
that of form.
"It is also obvious that, if substances are in a
sense numbers, they are so in this sense and not, as some say, as numbers
of units. For a definition is a sort of number; for (1) it is divisible,
and into indivisible parts (for definitory formulae are not infinite),
and number also is of this nature. And (2) as, when one of the parts of
which a number consists has been taken from or added to the number, it
is no longer the same number, but a different one, even if it is the very
smallest part that has been taken away or added, so the definition and
the essence will no longer remain when anything has been taken away or
added. And (3) the number must be something in virtue of which it is one,
and this these thinkers cannot state, what makes it one, if it is one (for
either it is not one but a sort of heap, or if it is, we ought to say what
it is that makes one out of many); and the definition is one, but similarly
they cannot say what makes it one. And this is a natural result; for the
same reason is applicable, and substance is one in the sense which we have
explained, and not, as some say, by being a sort of unit or point; each
is a complete reality and a definite nature. And (4) as number does not
admit of the more and the less, neither does substance, in the sense of
form, but if any substance does, it is only the substance which involves
matter. Let this, then, suffice for an account of the generation and destruction
of so-called substances in what sense it is possible and in what sense
impossible--and of the reduction of things to number.
Part 4
"
"Regarding material substance we must not forget that even if all
things come from the same first cause or have the same things for their
first causes, and if the same matter serves as starting-point for their
generation, yet there is a matter proper to each, e.g. for phlegm the sweet
or the fat, and for bile the bitter, or something else; though perhaps
these come from the same original matter. And there come to be several
matters for the same thing, when the one matter is matter for the other;
e.g. phlegm comes from the fat and from the sweet, if the fat comes from
the sweet; and it comes from bile by analysis of the bile into its ultimate
matter. For one thing comes from another in two senses, either because
it will be found at a later stage, or because it is produced if the other
is analysed into its original constituents. When the matter is one, different
things may be produced owing to difference in the moving cause; e.g. from
wood may be made both a chest and a bed. But some different things must
have their matter different; e.g. a saw could not be made of wood, nor
is this in the power of the moving cause; for it could not make a saw of
wool or of wood. But if, as a matter of fact, the same thing can be made
of different material, clearly the art, i.e. the moving principle, is the
same; for if both the matter and the moving cause were different, the product
would be so too.
"When one inquires into the cause of something,
one should, since 'causes' are spoken of in several senses, state all the
possible causes. what is the material cause of man? Shall we say 'the menstrual
fluid'? What is moving cause? Shall we say 'the seed'? The formal cause?
His essence. The final cause? His end. But perhaps the latter two are the
same.-It is the proximate causes we must state. What is the material cause?
We must name not fire or earth, but the matter peculiar to the thing.
"Regarding
the substances that are natural and generable, if the causes are really
these and of this number and we have to learn the causes, we must inquire
thus, if we are to inquire rightly. But in the case of natural but eternal
substances another account must be given. For perhaps some have no matter,
or not matter of this sort but only such as can be moved in respect of
place. Nor does matter belong to those things which exist by nature but
are not substances; their substratum is the substance. E.g what is the
cause of eclipse? What is its matter? There is none; the moon is that which
suffers eclipse. What is the moving cause which extinguished the light?
The earth. The final cause perhaps does not exist. The formal principle
is the definitory formula, but this is obscure if it does not include the
cause. E.g. what is eclipse? Deprivation of light. But if we add 'by the
earth's coming in between', this is the formula which includes the cause.
In the case of sleep it is not clear what it is that proximately has this
affection. Shall we say that it is the animal? Yes, but the animal in virtue
of what, i.e. what is the proximate subject? The heart or some other part.
Next, by what is it produced? Next, what is the affection-that of the proximate
subject, not of the whole animal? Shall we say that it is immobility of
such and such a kind? Yes, but to what process in the proximate subject
is this due?
Part 5
"
"Since some things are and are not, without coming to be and ceasing
to be, e.g. points, if they can be said to be, and in general forms (for
it is not 'white' comes to be, but the wood comes to be white, if everything
that comes to be comes from something and comes to be something), not all
contraries can come from one another, but it is in different senses that
a pale man comes from a dark man, and pale comes from dark. Nor has everything
matter, but only those things which come to be and change into one another.
Those things which, without ever being in course of changing, are or are
not, have no matter.
"There is difficulty in the question how the
matter of each thing is related to its contrary states. E.g. if the body
is potentially healthy, and disease is contrary to health, is it potentially
both healthy and diseased? And is water potentially wine and vinegar? We
answer that it is the matter of one in virtue of its positive state and
its form, and of the other in virtue of the privation of its positive state
and the corruption of it contrary to its nature. It is also hard to say
why wine is not said to be the matter of vinegar nor potentially vinegar
(though vinegar is produced from it), and why a living man is not said
to be potentially dead. In fact they are not, but the corruptions in question
are accidental, and it is the matter of the animal that is itself in virtue
of its corruption the potency and matter of a corpse, and it is water that
is the matter of vinegar. For the corpse comes from the animal, and vinegar
from wine, as night from day. And all the things which change thus into
one another must go back to their matter; e.g. if from a corpse is produced
an animal, the corpse first goes back to its matter, and only then becomes
an animal; and vinegar first goes back to water, and only then becomes
wine.
Part 6
"
"To return to the difficulty which has been stated with respect
both to definitions and to numbers, what is the cause of their unity? In
the case of all things which have several parts and in which the totality
is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something beside the
parts, there is a cause; for even in bodies contact is the cause of unity
in some cases, and in others viscosity or some other such quality. And
a definition is a set of words which is one not by being connected together,
like the Iliad, but by dealing with one object.-What then, is it that makes
man one; why is he one and not many, e.g. animal + biped, especially if
there are, as some say, an animal-itself and a biped-itself? Why are not
those Forms themselves the man, so that men would exist by participation
not in man, nor in-one Form, but in two, animal and biped, and in general
man would be not one but more than one thing, animal and biped?
"Clearly,
then, if people proceed thus in their usual manner of definition and speech,
they cannot explain and solve the difficulty. But if, as we say, one element
is matter and another is form, and one is potentially and the other actually,
the question will no longer be thought a difficulty. For this difficulty
is the same as would arise if 'round bronze' were the definition of 'cloak';
for this word would be a sign of the definitory formula, so that the question
is, what is the cause of the unity of 'round' and 'bronze'? The difficulty
disappears, because the one is matter, the other form. What, then, causes
this-that which was potentially to be actually-except, in the case of things
which are generated, the agent? For there is no other cause of the potential
sphere's becoming actually a sphere, but this was the essence of either.
Of matter some is intelligible, some perceptible, and in a formula there
is always an element of matter as well as one of actuality; e.g. the circle
is 'a plane figure'. But of the things which have no matter, either intelligible
or perceptible, each is by its nature essentially a kind of unity, as it
is essentially a kind of being-individual substance, quality, or quantity
(and so neither 'existent' nor 'one' is present in their definitions),
and the essence of each of them is by its very nature a kind of unity as
it is a kind of being-and so none of these has any reason outside itself,
for being one, nor for being a kind of being; for each is by its nature
a kind of being and a kind of unity, not as being in the genus 'being'
or 'one' nor in the sense that being and unity can exist apart from particulars.
"Owing to the difficulty about unity some speak of 'participation',
and raise the question, what is the cause of participation and what is
it to participate; and others speak of 'communion', as Lycophron says knowledge
is a communion of knowing with the soul; and others say life is a 'composition'
or 'connexion' of soul with body. Yet the same account applies to all cases;
for being healthy, too, will on this showing be either a 'communion' or
a 'connexion' or a 'composition' of soul and health, and the fact that
the bronze is a triangle will be a 'composition' of bronze and triangle,
and the fact that a thing is white will be a 'composition' of surface and
whiteness. The reason is that people look for a unifying formula, and a
difference, between potency and complete reality. But, as has been said,
the proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing, the one potentially,
and the other actually. Therefore it is like asking what in general is
the cause of unity and of a thing's being one; for each thing is a unity,
and the potential and the actual are somehow one. Therefore there is no
other cause here unless there is something which caused the movement from
potency into actuality. And all things which have no matter are without
qualification essentially unities.
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