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PHAEDO
by Plato
Translated by Benjamin Jowett


INTRODUCTION.



After an interval of some months or years, and at Phlius, a town of

Peloponnesus, the tale of the last hours of Socrates is narrated to

Echecrates and other Phliasians by Phaedo the 'beloved disciple.'  The

Dialogue necessarily takes the form of a narrative, because Socrates has to

be described acting as well as speaking.  The minutest particulars of the

event are interesting to distant friends, and the narrator has an equal

interest in them.



During the voyage of the sacred ship to and from Delos, which has occupied

thirty days, the execution of Socrates has been deferred.  (Compare Xen.

Mem.)  The time has been passed by him in conversation with a select

company of disciples.  But now the holy season is over, and the disciples

meet earlier than usual in order that they may converse with Socrates for

the last time.  Those who were present, and those who might have been

expected to be present, are mentioned by name.  There are Simmias and Cebes

(Crito), two disciples of Philolaus whom Socrates 'by his enchantments has

attracted from Thebes' (Mem.), Crito the aged friend, the attendant of the

prison, who is as good as a friend--these take part in the conversation. 

There are present also, Hermogenes, from whom Xenophon derived his

information about the trial of Socrates (Mem.), the 'madman' Apollodorus

(Symp.), Euclid and Terpsion from Megara (compare Theaet.), Ctesippus,

Antisthenes, Menexenus, and some other less-known members of the Socratic

circle, all of whom are silent auditors.  Aristippus, Cleombrotus, and

Plato are noted as absent.  Almost as soon as the friends of Socrates enter

the prison Xanthippe and her children are sent home in the care of one of

Crito's servants.  Socrates himself has just been released from chains, and

is led by this circumstance to make the natural remark that 'pleasure

follows pain.'  (Observe that Plato is preparing the way for his doctrine

of the alternation of opposites.)  'Aesop would have represented them in a

fable as a two-headed creature of the gods.'  The mention of Aesop reminds

Cebes of a question which had been asked by Evenus the poet (compare

Apol.):  'Why Socrates, who was not a poet, while in prison had been

putting Aesop into verse?'--'Because several times in his life he had been

warned in dreams that he should practise music; and as he was about to die

and was not certain of what was meant, he wished to fulfil the admonition

in the letter as well as in the spirit, by writing verses as well as by

cultivating philosophy.  Tell this to Evenus; and say that I would have him

follow me in death.'  'He is not at all the sort of man to comply with your

request, Socrates.'  'Why, is he not a philosopher?'  'Yes.'  'Then he will

be willing to die, although he will not take his own life, for that is held

to be unlawful.'



Cebes asks why suicide is thought not to be right, if death is to be

accounted a good?  Well, (1) according to one explanation, because man is a

prisoner, who must not open the door of his prison and run away--this is

the truth in a 'mystery.'  Or (2) rather, because he is not his own

property, but a possession of the gods, and has no right to make away with

that which does not belong to him.  But why, asks Cebes, if he is a

possession of the gods, should he wish to die and leave them?  For he is

under their protection; and surely he cannot take better care of himself

than they take of him.  Simmias explains that Cebes is really referring to

Socrates, whom they think too unmoved at the prospect of leaving the gods

and his friends.  Socrates answers that he is going to other gods who are

wise and good, and perhaps to better friends; and he professes that he is

ready to defend himself against the charge of Cebes.  The company shall be

his judges, and he hopes that he will be more successful in convincing them

than he had been in convincing the court.



The philosopher desires death--which the wicked world will insinuate that

he also deserves:  and perhaps he does, but not in any sense which they are

capable of understanding.  Enough of them:  the real question is, What is

the nature of that death which he desires?  Death is the separation of soul

and body--and the philosopher desires such a separation.  He would like to

be freed from the dominion of bodily pleasures and of the senses, which are

always perturbing his mental vision.  He wants to get rid of eyes and ears,

and with the light of the mind only to behold the light of truth.  All the

evils and impurities and necessities of men come from the body.  And death

separates him from these corruptions, which in life he cannot wholly lay

aside.  Why then should he repine when the hour of separation arrives? 

Why, if he is dead while he lives, should he fear that other death, through

which alone he can behold wisdom in her purity?



Besides, the philosopher has notions of good and evil unlike those of other

men.  For they are courageous because they are afraid of greater dangers,

and temperate because they desire greater pleasures.  But he disdains this

balancing of pleasures and pains, which is the exchange of commerce and not

of virtue.  All the virtues, including wisdom, are regarded by him only as

purifications of the soul.  And this was the meaning of the founders of the

mysteries when they said, 'Many are the wand-bearers but few are the

mystics.'  (Compare Matt. xxii.: 'Many are called but few are chosen.') 

And in the hope that he is one of these mystics, Socrates is now departing. 

This is his answer to any one who charges him with indifference at the

prospect of leaving the gods and his friends.



Still, a fear is expressed that the soul upon leaving the body may vanish

away like smoke or air.  Socrates in answer appeals first of all to the old

Orphic tradition that the souls of the dead are in the world below, and

that the living come from them.  This he attempts to found on a

philosophical assumption that all opposites--e.g. less, greater; weaker,

stronger; sleeping, waking; life, death--are generated out of each other. 

Nor can the process of generation be only a passage from living to dying,

for then all would end in death.  The perpetual sleeper (Endymion) would be

no longer distinguished from the rest of mankind.  The circle of nature is

not complete unless the living come from the dead as well as pass to them.



The Platonic doctrine of reminiscence is then adduced as a confirmation of

the pre-existence of the soul.  Some proofs of this doctrine are demanded.

One proof given is the same as that of the Meno, and is derived from the

latent knowledge of mathematics, which may be elicited from an unlearned

person when a diagram is presented to him.  Again, there is a power of

association, which from seeing Simmias may remember Cebes, or from seeing a

picture of Simmias may remember Simmias.  The lyre may recall the player of

the lyre, and equal pieces of wood or stone may be associated with the

higher notion of absolute equality.  But here observe that material

equalities fall short of the conception of absolute equality with which

they are compared, and which is the measure of them.  And the measure or

standard must be prior to that which is measured, the idea of equality

prior to the visible equals.  And if prior to them, then prior also to the

perceptions of the senses which recall them, and therefore either given

before birth or at birth.  But all men have not this knowledge, nor have

any without a process of reminiscence; which is a proof that it is not

innate or given at birth, unless indeed it was given and taken away at the

same instant.  But if not given to men in birth, it must have been given

before birth--this is the only alternative which remains.  And if we had

ideas in a former state, then our souls must have existed and must have had

intelligence in a former state.  The pre-existence of the soul stands or

falls with the doctrine of ideas.



It is objected by Simmias and Cebes that these arguments only prove a

former and not a future existence.  Socrates answers this objection by

recalling the previous argument, in which he had shown that the living come

from the dead.  But the fear that the soul at departing may vanish into air

(especially if there is a wind blowing at the time) has not yet been

charmed away.  He proceeds:  When we fear that the soul will vanish away,

let us ask ourselves what is that which we suppose to be liable to

dissolution?  Is it the simple or the compound, the unchanging or the

changing, the invisible idea or the visible object of sense?  Clearly the

latter and not the former; and therefore not the soul, which in her own

pure thought is unchangeable, and only when using the senses descends into

the region of change.  Again, the soul commands, the body serves:  in this

respect too the soul is akin to the divine, and the body to the mortal. 

And in every point of view the soul is the image of divinity and

immortality, and the body of the human and mortal.  And whereas the body is

liable to speedy dissolution, the soul is almost if not quite indissoluble. 

(Compare Tim.)  Yet even the body may be preserved for ages by the

embalmer's art:  how unlikely, then, that the soul will perish and be

dissipated into air while on her way to the good and wise God!  She has

been gathered into herself, holding aloof from the body, and practising

death all her life long, and she is now finally released from the errors

and follies and passions of men, and for ever dwells in the company of the

gods.



But the soul which is polluted and engrossed by the corporeal, and has no

eye except that of the senses, and is weighed down by the bodily appetites,

cannot attain to this abstraction.  In her fear of the world below she

lingers about the sepulchre, loath to leave the body which she loved, a

ghostly apparition, saturated with sense, and therefore visible.  At length

entering into some animal of a nature congenial to her former life of

sensuality or violence, she takes the form of an ass, a wolf or a kite. 

And of these earthly souls the happiest are those who have practised virtue

without philosophy; they are allowed to pass into gentle and social

natures, such as bees and ants.  (Compare Republic, Meno.)  But only the

philosopher who departs pure is permitted to enter the company of the gods.

(Compare Phaedrus.)  This is the reason why he abstains from fleshly lusts,

and not because he fears loss or disgrace, which is the motive of other

men.  He too has been a captive, and the willing agent of his own

captivity.  But philosophy has spoken to him, and he has heard her voice;

she has gently entreated him, and brought him out of the 'miry clay,' and

purged away the mists of passion and the illusions of sense which envelope

him; his soul has escaped from the influence of pleasures and pains, which

are like nails fastening her to the body.  To that prison-house she will

not return; and therefore she abstains from bodily pleasures--not from a

desire of having more or greater ones, but because she knows that only when

calm and free from the dominion of the body can she behold the light of

truth.



Simmias and Cebes remain in doubt; but they are unwilling to raise

objections at such a time.  Socrates wonders at their reluctance.  Let them

regard him rather as the swan, who, having sung the praises of Apollo all

his life long, sings at his death more lustily than ever.  Simmias

acknowledges that there is cowardice in not probing truth to the bottom. 

'And if truth divine and inspired is not to be had, then let a man take the

best of human notions, and upon this frail bark let him sail through life.' 

He proceeds to state his difficulty:  It has been argued that the soul is

invisible and incorporeal, and therefore immortal, and prior to the body. 

But is not the soul acknowledged to be a harmony, and has she not the same

relation to the body, as the harmony--which like her is invisible--has to

the lyre?  And yet the harmony does not survive the lyre.  Cebes has also

an objection, which like Simmias he expresses in a figure.  He is willing

to admit that the soul is more lasting than the body.  But the more lasting

nature of the soul does not prove her immortality; for after having worn

out many bodies in a single life, and many more in successive births and

deaths, she may at last perish, or, as Socrates afterwards restates the

objection, the very act of birth may be the beginning of her death, and her

last body may survive her, just as the coat of an old weaver is left behind

him after he is dead, although a man is more lasting than his coat.  And he

who would prove the immortality of the soul, must prove not only that the

soul outlives one or many bodies, but that she outlives them all.



The audience, like the chorus in a play, for a moment interpret the

feelings of the actors; there is a temporary depression, and then the

enquiry is resumed.  It is a melancholy reflection that arguments, like

men, are apt to be deceivers; and those who have been often deceived become

distrustful both of arguments and of friends.  But this unfortunate

experience should not make us either haters of men or haters of arguments. 

The want of health and truth is not in the argument, but in ourselves. 

Socrates, who is about to die, is sensible of his own weakness; he desires

to be impartial, but he cannot help feeling that he has too great an

interest in the truth of the argument.  And therefore he would have his

friends examine and refute him, if they think that he is in error.



At his request Simmias and Cebes repeat their objections.  They do not go

to the length of denying the pre-existence of ideas.  Simmias is of opinion

that the soul is a harmony of the body.  But the admission of the pre-

existence of ideas, and therefore of the soul, is at variance with this. 

(Compare a parallel difficulty in Theaet.)  For a harmony is an effect,

whereas the soul is not an effect, but a cause; a harmony follows, but the

soul leads; a harmony admits of degrees, and the soul has no degrees. 

Again, upon the supposition that the soul is a harmony, why is one soul

better than another?  Are they more or less harmonized, or is there one

harmony within another?  But the soul does not admit of degrees, and cannot

therefore be more or less harmonized.  Further, the soul is often engaged

in resisting the affections of the body, as Homer describes Odysseus

'rebuking his heart.'  Could he have written this under the idea that the

soul is a harmony of the body?  Nay rather, are we not contradicting Homer

and ourselves in affirming anything of the sort?



The goddess Harmonia, as Socrates playfully terms the argument of Simmias,

has been happily disposed of; and now an answer has to be given to the

Theban Cadmus.  Socrates recapitulates the argument of Cebes, which, as he

remarks, involves the whole question of natural growth or causation; about

this he proposes to narrate his own mental experience.  When he was young

he had puzzled himself with physics:  he had enquired into the growth and

decay of animals, and the origin of thought, until at last he began to

doubt the self-evident fact that growth is the result of eating and

drinking; and so he arrived at the conclusion that he was not meant for

such enquiries.  Nor was he less perplexed with notions of comparison and

number.  At first he had imagined himself to understand differences of

greater and less, and to know that ten is two more than eight, and the

like.  But now those very notions appeared to him to contain a

contradiction.  For how can one be divided into two?  Or two be compounded

into one?  These are difficulties which Socrates cannot answer.  Of

generation and destruction he knows nothing.  But he has a confused notion

of another method in which matters of this sort are to be investigated. 

(Compare Republic; Charm.)



Then he heard some one reading out of a book of Anaxagoras, that mind is

the cause of all things.  And he said to himself:  If mind is the cause of

all things, surely mind must dispose them all for the best.  The new

teacher will show me this 'order of the best' in man and nature.  How great

had been his hopes and how great his disappointment!  For he found that his

new friend was anything but consistent in his use of mind as a cause, and

that he soon introduced winds, waters, and other eccentric notions. 

(Compare Arist. Metaph.)  It was as if a person had said that Socrates is

sitting here because he is made up of bones and muscles, instead of telling

the true reason--that he is here because the Athenians have thought good to

sentence him to death, and he has thought good to await his sentence.  Had

his bones and muscles been left by him to their own ideas of right, they

would long ago have taken themselves off.  But surely there is a great

confusion of the cause and condition in all this.  And this confusion also

leads people into all sorts of erroneous theories about the position and

motions of the earth.  None of them know how much stronger than any Atlas

is the power of the best.  But this 'best' is still undiscovered; and in

enquiring after the cause, we can only hope to attain the second best.



Now there is a danger in the contemplation of the nature of things, as

there is a danger in looking at the sun during an eclipse, unless the

precaution is taken of looking only at the image reflected in the water, or

in a glass.  (Compare Laws; Republic.)  'I was afraid,' says Socrates,

'that I might injure the eye of the soul.  I thought that I had better

return to the old and safe method of ideas.  Though I do not mean to say

that he who contemplates existence through the medium of ideas sees only

through a glass darkly, any more than he who contemplates actual effects.'



If the existence of ideas is granted to him, Socrates is of opinion that he

will then have no difficulty in proving the immortality of the soul.  He

will only ask for a further admission:--that beauty is the cause of the

beautiful, greatness the cause of the great, smallness of the small, and so

on of other things.  This is a safe and simple answer, which escapes the

contradictions of greater and less (greater by reason of that which is

smaller!), of addition and subtraction, and the other difficulties of

relation.  These subtleties he is for leaving to wiser heads than his own;

he prefers to test ideas by the consistency of their consequences, and, if

asked to give an account of them, goes back to some higher idea or

hypothesis which appears to him to be the best, until at last he arrives at

a resting-place.  (Republic; Phil.)



The doctrine of ideas, which has long ago received the assent of the

Socratic circle, is now affirmed by the Phliasian auditor to command the

assent of any man of sense.  The narrative is continued; Socrates is

desirous of explaining how opposite ideas may appear to co-exist but do not

really co-exist in the same thing or person.  For example, Simmias may be

said to have greatness and also smallness, because he is greater than

Socrates and less than Phaedo.  And yet Simmias is not really great and

also small, but only when compared to Phaedo and Socrates.  I use the

illustration, says Socrates, because I want to show you not only that ideal

opposites exclude one another, but also the opposites in us.  I, for

example, having the attribute of smallness remain small, and cannot become

great:  the smallness which is in me drives out greatness.



One of the company here remarked that this was inconsistent with the old

assertion that opposites generated opposites.  But that, replies Socrates,

was affirmed, not of opposite ideas either in us or in nature, but of

opposition in the concrete--not of life and death, but of individuals

living and dying.  When this objection has been removed, Socrates proceeds: 

This doctrine of the mutual exclusion of opposites is not only true of the

opposites themselves, but of things which are inseparable from them.  For

example, cold and heat are opposed; and fire, which is inseparable from

heat, cannot co-exist with cold, or snow, which is inseparable from cold,

with heat.  Again, the number three excludes the number four, because three

is an odd number and four is an even number, and the odd is opposed to the

even.  Thus we are able to proceed a step beyond 'the safe and simple

answer.'  We may say, not only that the odd excludes the even, but that the

number three, which participates in oddness, excludes the even.  And in

like manner, not only does life exclude death, but the soul, of which life

is the inseparable attribute, also excludes death.  And that of which life

is the inseparable attribute is by the force of the terms imperishable.  If

the odd principle were imperishable, then the number three would not perish

but remove, on the approach of the even principle.  But the immortal is

imperishable; and therefore the soul on the approach of death does not

perish but removes.



Thus all objections appear to be finally silenced.  And now the application

has to be made:  If the soul is immortal, 'what manner of persons ought we

to be?' having regard not only to time but to eternity.  For death is not

the end of all, and the wicked is not released from his evil by death; but

every one carries with him into the world below that which he is or has

become, and that only.



For after death the soul is carried away to judgment, and when she has

received her punishment returns to earth in the course of ages.  The wise

soul is conscious of her situation, and follows the attendant angel who

guides her through the windings of the world below; but the impure soul

wanders hither and thither without companion or guide, and is carried at

last to her own place, as the pure soul is also carried away to hers.  'In

order that you may understand this, I must first describe to you the nature

and conformation of the earth.'



Now the whole earth is a globe placed in the centre of the heavens, and is

maintained there by the perfection of balance.  That which we call the

earth is only one of many small hollows, wherein collect the mists and

waters and the thick lower air; but the true earth is above, and is in a

finer and subtler element.  And if, like birds, we could fly to the surface

of the air, in the same manner that fishes come to the top of the sea, then

we should behold the true earth and the true heaven and the true stars. 

Our earth is everywhere corrupted and corroded; and even the land which is

fairer than the sea, for that is a mere chaos or waste of water and mud and

sand, has nothing to show in comparison of the other world.  But the

heavenly earth is of divers colours, sparkling with jewels brighter than

gold and whiter than any snow, having flowers and fruits innumerable.  And

the inhabitants dwell some on the shore of the sea of air, others in

'islets of the blest,' and they hold converse with the gods, and behold the

sun, moon and stars as they truly are, and their other blessedness is of a

piece with this.



The hollows on the surface of the globe vary in size and shape from that

which we inhabit:  but all are connected by passages and perforations in

the interior of the earth.  And there is one huge chasm or opening called

Tartarus, into which streams of fire and water and liquid mud are ever

flowing; of these small portions find their way to the surface and form

seas and rivers and volcanoes.  There is a perpetual inhalation and

exhalation of the air rising and falling as the waters pass into the depths

of the earth and return again, in their course forming lakes and rivers,

but never descending below the centre of the earth; for on either side the

rivers flowing either way are stopped by a precipice.  These rivers are

many and mighty, and there are four principal ones, Oceanus, Acheron,

Pyriphlegethon, and Cocytus.  Oceanus is the river which encircles the

earth; Acheron takes an opposite direction, and after flowing under the

earth through desert places, at last reaches the Acherusian lake,--this is

the river at which the souls of the dead await their return to earth. 

Pyriphlegethon is a stream of fire, which coils round the earth and flows

into the depths of Tartarus.  The fourth river, Cocytus, is that which is

called by the poets the Stygian river, and passes into and forms the lake

Styx, from the waters of which it gains new and strange powers.  This

river, too, falls into Tartarus.



The dead are first of all judged according to their deeds, and those who

are incurable are thrust into Tartarus, from which they never come out. 

Those who have only committed venial sins are first purified of them, and

then rewarded for the good which they have done.  Those who have committed

crimes, great indeed, but not unpardonable, are thrust into Tartarus, but

are cast forth at the end of a year by way of Pyriphlegethon or Cocytus,

and these carry them as far as the Acherusian lake, where they call upon

their victims to let them come out of the rivers into the lake.  And if

they prevail, then they are let out and their sufferings cease:  if not,

they are borne unceasingly into Tartarus and back again, until they at last

obtain mercy.  The pure souls also receive their reward, and have their

abode in the upper earth, and a select few in still fairer 'mansions.'



Socrates is not prepared to insist on the literal accuracy of this

description, but he is confident that something of the kind is true.  He

who has sought after the pleasures of knowledge and rejected the pleasures

of the body, has reason to be of good hope at the approach of death; whose

voice is already speaking to him, and who will one day be heard calling all

men.



The hour has come at which he must drink the poison, and not much remains

to be done.  How shall they bury him?  That is a question which he refuses

to entertain, for they are burying, not him, but his dead body.  His

friends had once been sureties that he would remain, and they shall now be

sureties that he has run away.  Yet he would not die without the customary

ceremonies of washing and burial.  Shall he make a libation of the poison?

In the spirit he will, but not in the letter.  One request he utters in the

very act of death, which has been a puzzle to after ages.  With a sort of

irony he remembers that a trifling religious duty is still unfulfilled,

just as above he desires before he departs to compose a few verses in order

to satisfy a scruple about a dream--unless, indeed, we suppose him to mean,

that he was now restored to health, and made the customary offering to

Asclepius in token of his recovery.



...



1.  The doctrine of the immortality of the soul has sunk deep into the

heart of the human race; and men are apt to rebel against any examination

of the nature or grounds of their belief.  They do not like to acknowledge

that this, as well as the other 'eternal ideas; of man, has a history in

time, which may be traced in Greek poetry or philosophy, and also in the

Hebrew Scriptures.  They convert feeling into reasoning, and throw a

network of dialectics over that which is really a deeply-rooted instinct. 

In the same temper which Socrates reproves in himself they are disposed to

think that even fallacies will do no harm, for they will die with them, and

while they live they will gain by the delusion.  And when they consider the

numberless bad arguments which have been pressed into the service of

theology, they say, like the companions of Socrates, 'What argument can we

ever trust again?'  But there is a better and higher spirit to be gathered

from the Phaedo, as well as from the other writings of Plato, which says

that first principles should be most constantly reviewed (Phaedo and

Crat.), and that the highest subjects demand of us the greatest accuracy

(Republic); also that we must not become misologists because arguments are

apt to be deceivers.



2.  In former ages there was a customary rather than a reasoned belief in

the immortality of the soul.  It was based on the authority of the Church,

on the necessity of such a belief to morality and the order of society, on

the evidence of an historical fact, and also on analogies and figures of

speech which filled up the void or gave an expression in words to a

cherished instinct.  The mass of mankind went on their way busy with the

affairs of this life, hardly stopping to think about another.  But in our

own day the question has been reopened, and it is doubtful whether the

belief which in the first ages of Christianity was the strongest motive of

action can survive the conflict with a scientific age in which the rules of

evidence are stricter and the mind has become more sensitive to criticism.

It has faded into the distance by a natural process as it was removed

further and further from the historical fact on which it has been supposed

to rest.  Arguments derived from material things such as the seed and the

ear of corn or transitions in the life of animals from one state of being

to another (the chrysalis and the butterfly) are not 'in pari materia' with

arguments from the visible to the invisible, and are therefore felt to be

no longer applicable.  The evidence to the historical fact seems to be

weaker than was once supposed:  it is not consistent with itself, and is

based upon documents which are of unknown origin.  The immortality of man

must be proved by other arguments than these if it is again to become a

living belief.  We must ask ourselves afresh why we still maintain it, and

seek to discover a foundation for it in the nature of God and in the first

principles of morality.



3.  At the outset of the discussion we may clear away a confusion.  We

certainly do not mean by the immortality of the soul the immortality of

fame, which whether worth having or not can only be ascribed to a very

select class of the whole race of mankind, and even the interest in these

few is comparatively short-lived.  To have been a benefactor to the world,

whether in a higher or a lower sphere of life and thought, is a great

thing:  to have the reputation of being one, when men have passed out of

the sphere of earthly praise or blame, is hardly worthy of consideration.

The memory of a great man, so far from being immortal, is really limited to

his own generation:--so long as his friends or his disciples are alive, so

long as his books continue to be read, so long as his political or military

successes fill a page in the history of his country.  The praises which are

bestowed upon him at his death hardly last longer than the flowers which

are strewed upon his coffin or the 'immortelles' which are laid upon his

tomb.  Literature makes the most of its heroes, but the true man is well

aware that far from enjoying an immortality of fame, in a generation or

two, or even in a much shorter time, he will be forgotten and the world

will get on without him.



4.  Modern philosophy is perplexed at this whole question, which is

sometimes fairly given up and handed over to the realm of faith.  The

perplexity should not be forgotten by us when we attempt to submit the

Phaedo of Plato to the requirements of logic.  For what idea can we form of

the soul when separated from the body?  Or how can the soul be united with

the body and still be independent?  Is the soul related to the body as the

ideal to the real, or as the whole to the parts, or as the subject to the

object, or as the cause to the effect, or as the end to the means?  Shall

we say with Aristotle, that the soul is the entelechy or form of an

organized living body? or with Plato, that she has a life of her own?  Is

the Pythagorean image of the harmony, or that of the monad, the truer

expression?  Is the soul related to the body as sight to the eye, or as the

boatman to his boat?  (Arist. de Anim.)  And in another state of being is

the soul to be conceived of as vanishing into infinity, hardly possessing

an existence which she can call her own, as in the pantheistic system of

Spinoza: or as an individual informing another body and entering into new

relations, but retaining her own character?  (Compare Gorgias.)  Or is the

opposition of soul and body a mere illusion, and the true self neither soul

nor body, but the union of the two in the 'I' which is above them?  And is

death the assertion of this individuality in the higher nature, and the

falling away into nothingness of the lower?  Or are we vainly attempting to

pass the boundaries of human thought?  The body and the soul seem to be

inseparable, not only in fact, but in our conceptions of them; and any

philosophy which too closely unites them, or too widely separates them,

either in this life or in another, disturbs the balance of human nature. 

No thinker has perfectly adjusted them, or been entirely consistent with

himself in describing their relation to one another.  Nor can we wonder

that Plato in the infancy of human thought should have confused mythology

and philosophy, or have mistaken verbal arguments for real ones.



5.  Again, believing in the immortality of the soul, we must still ask the

question of Socrates, 'What is that which we suppose to be immortal?'  Is

it the personal and individual element in us, or the spiritual and

universal?  Is it the principle of knowledge or of goodness, or the union

of the two?  Is it the mere force of life which is determined to be, or the

consciousness of self which cannot be got rid of, or the fire of genius

which refuses to be extinguished?  Or is there a hidden being which is

allied to the Author of all existence, who is because he is perfect, and to

whom our ideas of perfection give us a title to belong?  Whatever answer is

given by us to these questions, there still remains the necessity of

allowing the permanence of evil, if not for ever, at any rate for a time,

in order that the wicked 'may not have too good a bargain.'  For the

annihilation of evil at death, or the eternal duration of it, seem to

involve equal difficulties in the moral government of the universe. 

Sometimes we are led by our feelings, rather than by our reason, to think

of the good and wise only as existing in another life.  Why should the

mean, the weak, the idiot, the infant, the herd of men who have never in

any proper sense the use of reason, reappear with blinking eyes in the

light of another world?  But our second thought is that the hope of

humanity is a common one, and that all or none will be partakers of

immortality.  Reason does not allow us to suppose that we have any greater

claims than others, and experience may often reveal to us unexpected

flashes of the higher nature in those whom we had despised.  Why should the

wicked suffer any more than ourselves? had we been placed in their

circumstances should we have been any better than they?  The worst of men

are objects of pity rather than of anger to the philanthropist; must they

not be equally such to divine benevolence?  Even more than the good they

have need of another life; not that they may be punished, but that they may

be educated.  These are a few of the reflections which arise in our minds

when we attempt to assign any form to our conceptions of a future state.



There are some other questions which are disturbing to us because we have

no answer to them.  What is to become of the animals in a future state? 

Have we not seen dogs more faithful and intelligent than men, and men who

are more stupid and brutal than any animals?  Does their life cease at

death, or is there some 'better thing reserved' also for them?  They may be

said to have a shadow or imitation of morality, and imperfect moral claims

upon the benevolence of man and upon the justice of God.  We cannot think

of the least or lowest of them, the insect, the bird, the inhabitants of

the sea or the desert, as having any place in a future world, and if not

all, why should those who are specially attached to man be deemed worthy of

any exceptional privilege?  When we reason about such a subject, almost at

once we degenerate into nonsense.  It is a passing thought which has no

real hold on the mind.  We may argue for the existence of animals in a

future state from the attributes of God, or from texts of Scripture ('Are

not two sparrows sold for one farthing?' etc.), but the truth is that we

are only filling up the void of another world with our own fancies.  Again,

we often talk about the origin of evil, that great bugbear of theologians,

by which they frighten us into believing any superstition.  What answer can

be made to the old commonplace, 'Is not God the author of evil, if he

knowingly permitted, but could have prevented it?'  Even if we assume that

the inequalities of this life are rectified by some transposition of human

beings in another, still the existence of the very least evil if it could

have been avoided, seems to be at variance with the love and justice of

God.  And so we arrive at the conclusion that we are carrying logic too

far, and that the attempt to frame the world according to a rule of divine

perfection is opposed to experience and had better be given up.  The case

of the animals is our own.  We must admit that the Divine Being, although

perfect himself, has placed us in a state of life in which we may work

together with him for good, but we are very far from having attained to it.



6.  Again, ideas must be given through something; and we are always prone

to argue about the soul from analogies of outward things which may serve to

embody our thoughts, but are also partly delusive.  For we cannot reason

from the natural to the spiritual, or from the outward to the inward.  The

progress of physiological science, without bringing us nearer to the great

secret, has tended to remove some erroneous notions respecting the

relations of body and mind, and in this we have the advantage of the

ancients.  But no one imagines that any seed of immortality is to be

discerned in our mortal frames.  Most people have been content to rest

their belief in another life on the agreement of the more enlightened part

of mankind, and on the inseparable connection of such a doctrine with the

existence of a God--also in a less degree on the impossibility of doubting

about the continued existence of those whom we love and reverence in this

world.  And after all has been said, the figure, the analogy, the argument,

are felt to be only approximations in different forms to an expression of

the common sentiment of the human heart.  That we shall live again is far

more certain than that we shall take any particular form of life.



7.  When we speak of the immortality of the soul, we must ask further what

we mean by the word immortality.  For of the duration of a living being in

countless ages we can form no conception; far less than a three years' old

child of the whole of life.  The naked eye might as well try to see the

furthest star in the infinity of heaven.  Whether time and space really

exist when we take away the limits of them may be doubted; at any rate the

thought of them when unlimited us so overwhelming to us as to lose all

distinctness.  Philosophers have spoken of them as forms of the human mind,

but what is the mind without them?  As then infinite time, or an existence

out of time, which are the only possible explanations of eternal duration,

are equally inconceivable to us, let us substitute for them a hundred or a

thousand years after death, and ask not what will be our employment in

eternity, but what will happen to us in that definite portion of time; or

what is now happening to those who passed out of life a hundred or a

thousand years ago.  Do we imagine that the wicked are suffering torments,

or that the good are singing the praises of God, during a period longer

than that of a whole life, or of ten lives of men?  Is the suffering

physical or mental?  And does the worship of God consist only of praise, or

of many forms of service?  Who are the wicked, and who are the good, whom

we venture to divide by a hard and fast line; and in which of the two

classes should we place ourselves and our friends?  May we not suspect that

we are making differences of kind, because we are unable to imagine

differences of degree?--putting the whole human race into heaven or hell

for the greater convenience of logical division?  Are we not at the same

time describing them both in superlatives, only that we may satisfy the

demands of rhetoric?  What is that pain which does not become deadened

after a thousand years? or what is the nature of that pleasure or happiness

which never wearies by monotony?  Earthly pleasures and pains are short in

proportion as they are keen; of any others which are both intense and

lasting we have no experience, and can form no idea.  The words or figures

of speech which we use are not consistent with themselves.  For are we not

imagining Heaven under the similitude of a church, and Hell as a prison, or

perhaps a madhouse or chamber of horrors?  And yet to beings constituted as

we are, the monotony of singing psalms would be as great an infliction as

the pains of hell, and might be even pleasantly interrupted by them.  Where

are the actions worthy of rewards greater than those which are conferred on

the greatest benefactors of mankind?  And where are the crimes which

according to Plato's merciful reckoning,--more merciful, at any rate, than

the eternal damnation of so-called Christian teachers,--for every ten years

in this life deserve a hundred of punishment in the life to come?  We

should be ready to die of pity if we could see the least of the sufferings

which the writers of Infernos and Purgatorios have attributed to the

damned.  Yet these joys and terrors seem hardly to exercise an appreciable

influence over the lives of men.  The wicked man when old, is not, as Plato

supposes (Republic), more agitated by the terrors of another world when he

is nearer to them, nor the good in an ecstasy at the joys of which he is

soon to be the partaker.  Age numbs the sense of both worlds; and the habit

of life is strongest in death.  Even the dying mother is dreaming of her

lost children as they were forty or fifty years before, 'pattering over the

boards,' not of reunion with them in another state of being.  Most persons

when the last hour comes are resigned to the order of nature and the will

of God.  They are not thinking of Dante's Inferno or Paradiso, or of the

Pilgrim's Progress.  Heaven and hell are not realities to them, but words

or ideas; the outward symbols of some great mystery, they hardly know what.

Many noble poems and pictures have been suggested by the traditional

representations of them, which have been fixed in forms of art and can no

longer be altered.  Many sermons have been filled with descriptions of

celestial or infernal mansions.  But hardly even in childhood did the

thought of heaven and hell supply the motives of our actions, or at any

time seriously affect the substance of our belief.



8.  Another life must be described, if at all, in forms of thought and not

of sense.  To draw pictures of heaven and hell, whether in the language of

Scripture or any other, adds nothing to our real knowledge, but may perhaps

disguise our ignorance.  The truest conception which we can form of a

future life is a state of progress or education--a progress from evil to

good, from ignorance to knowledge.  To this we are led by the analogy of

the present life, in which we see different races and nations of men, and

different men and women of the same nation, in various states or stages of

cultivation; some more and some less developed, and all of them capable of

improvement under favourable circumstances.  There are punishments too of

children when they are growing up inflicted by their parents, of elder

offenders which are imposed by the law of the land, of all men at all times

of life, which are attached by the laws of nature to the performance of

certain actions.  All these punishments are really educational; that is to

say, they are not intended to retaliate on the offender, but to teach him a

lesson.  Also there is an element of chance in them, which is another name

for our ignorance of the laws of nature.  There is evil too inseparable

from good (compare Lysis); not always punished here, as good is not always

rewarded.  It is capable of being indefinitely diminished; and as knowledge

increases, the element of chance may more and more disappear.



For we do not argue merely from the analogy of the present state of this

world to another, but from the analogy of a probable future to which we are

tending.  The greatest changes of which we have had experience as yet are

due to our increasing knowledge of history and of nature.  They have been

produced by a few minds appearing in three or four favoured nations, in a

comparatively short period of time.  May we be allowed to imagine the minds

of men everywhere working together during many ages for the completion of

our knowledge?  May not the science of physiology transform the world? 

Again, the majority of mankind have really experienced some moral

improvement; almost every one feels that he has tendencies to good, and is

capable of becoming better.  And these germs of good are often found to be

developed by new circumstances, like stunted trees when transplanted to a

better soil.  The differences between the savage and the civilized man, or

between the civilized man in old and new countries, may be indefinitely

increased.  The first difference is the effect of a few thousand, the

second of a few hundred years.  We congratulate ourselves that slavery has

become industry; that law and constitutional government have superseded

despotism and violence; that an ethical religion has taken the place of

Fetichism.  There may yet come a time when the many may be as well off as

the few; when no one will be weighed down by excessive toil; when the

necessity of providing for the body will not interfere with mental

improvement; when the physical frame may be strengthened and developed; and

the religion of all men may become a reasonable service.



Nothing therefore, either in the present state of man or in the tendencies

of the future, as far as we can entertain conjecture of them, would lead us

to suppose that God governs us vindictively in this world, and therefore we

have no reason to infer that he will govern us vindictively in another. 

The true argument from analogy is not, 'This life is a mixed state of

justice and injustice, of great waste, of sudden casualties, of

disproportionate punishments, and therefore the like inconsistencies,

irregularities, injustices are to be expected in another;' but 'This life

is subject to law, and is in a state of progress, and therefore law and

progress may be believed to be the governing principles of another.'  All

the analogies of this world would be against unmeaning punishments

inflicted a hundred or a thousand years after an offence had been

committed.  Suffering there might be as a part of education, but not

hopeless or protracted; as there might be a retrogression of individuals or

of bodies of men, yet not such as to interfere with a plan for the

improvement of the whole (compare Laws.)



9.  But some one will say:  That we cannot reason from the seen to the

unseen, and that we are creating another world after the image of this,

just as men in former ages have created gods in their own likeness.  And

we, like the companions of Socrates, may feel discouraged at hearing our

favourite 'argument from analogy' thus summarily disposed of.  Like

himself, too, we may adduce other arguments in which he seems to have

anticipated us, though he expresses them in different language.  For we

feel that the soul partakes of the ideal and invisible; and can never fall

into the error of confusing the external circumstances of man with his

higher self; or his origin with his nature.  It is as repugnant to us as it

was to him to imagine that our moral ideas are to be attributed only to

cerebral forces.  The value of a human soul, like the value of a man's life

to himself, is inestimable, and cannot be reckoned in earthly or material

things.  The human being alone has the consciousness of truth and justice

and love, which is the consciousness of God.  And the soul becoming more

conscious of these, becomes more conscious of her own immortality.



10.  The last ground of our belief in immortality, and the strongest, is

the perfection of the divine nature.  The mere fact of the existence of God

does not tend to show the continued existence of man.  An evil God or an

indifferent God might have had the power, but not the will, to preserve us.

He might have regarded us as fitted to minister to his service by a

succession of existences,--like the animals, without attributing to each

soul an incomparable value.  But if he is perfect, he must will that all

rational beings should partake of that perfection which he himself is.  In

the words of the Timaeus, he is good, and therefore he desires that all

other things should be as like himself as possible.  And the manner in

which he accomplishes this is by permitting evil, or rather degrees of

good, which are otherwise called evil.  For all progress is good relatively

to the past, and yet may be comparatively evil when regarded in the light

of the future.  Good and evil are relative terms, and degrees of evil are

merely the negative aspect of degrees of good.  Of the absolute goodness of

any finite nature we can form no conception; we are all of us in process of

transition from one degree of good or evil to another.  The difficulties

which are urged about the origin or existence of evil are mere dialectical

puzzles, standing in the same relation to Christian philosophy as the

puzzles of the Cynics and Megarians to the philosophy of Plato.  They arise

out of the tendency of the human mind to regard good and evil both as

relative and absolute; just as the riddles about motion are to be explained

by the double conception of space or matter, which the human mind has the

power of regarding either as continuous or discrete.



In speaking of divine perfection, we mean to say that God is just and true

and loving, the author of order and not of disorder, of good and not of

evil.  Or rather, that he is justice, that he is truth, that he is love,

that he is order, that he is the very progress of which we were speaking;

and that wherever these qualities are present, whether in the human soul or

in the order of nature, there is God.  We might still see him everywhere,

if we had not been mistakenly seeking for him apart from us, instead of in

us; away from the laws of nature, instead of in them.  And we become united

to him not by mystical absorption, but by partaking, whether consciously or

unconsciously, of that truth and justice and love which he himself is.



Thus the belief in the immortality of the soul rests at last on the belief

in God.  If there is a good and wise God, then there is a progress of

mankind towards perfection; and if there is no progress of men towards

perfection, then there is no good and wise God.  We cannot suppose that the

moral government of God of which we see the beginnings in the world and in

ourselves will cease when we pass out of life.



11.  Considering the 'feebleness of the human faculties and the uncertainty

of the subject,' we are inclined to believe that the fewer our words the

better.  At the approach of death there is not much said; good men are too

honest to go out of the world professing more than they know.  There is

perhaps no important subject about which, at any time, even religious

people speak so little to one another.  In the fulness of life the thought

of death is mostly awakened by the sight or recollection of the death of

others rather than by the prospect of our own.  We must also acknowledge

that there are degrees of the belief in immortality, and many forms in

which it presents itself to the mind.  Some persons will say no more than

that they trust in God, and that they leave all to Him.  It is a great part

of true religion not to pretend to know more than we do.  Others when they

quit this world are comforted with the hope 'That they will see and know

their friends in heaven.'  But it is better to leave them in the hands of

God and to be assured that 'no evil shall touch them.'  There are others

again to whom the belief in a divine personality has ceased to have any

longer a meaning; yet they are satisfied that the end of all is not here,

but that something still remains to us, 'and some better thing for the good

than for the evil.'  They are persuaded, in spite of their theological

nihilism, that the ideas of justice and truth and holiness and love are

realities.  They cherish an enthusiastic devotion to the first principles

of morality.  Through these they see, or seem to see, darkly, and in a

figure, that the soul is immortal.



But besides differences of theological opinion which must ever prevail

about things unseen, the hope of immortality is weaker or stronger in men

at one time of life than at another; it even varies from day to day.  It

comes and goes; the mind, like the sky, is apt to be overclouded.  Other

generations of men may have sometimes lived under an 'eclipse of faith,' to

us the total disappearance of it might be compared to the 'sun falling from

heaven.'  And we may sometimes have to begin again and acquire the belief

for ourselves; or to win it back again when it is lost.  It is really

weakest in the hour of death.  For Nature, like a kind mother or nurse,

lays us to sleep without frightening us; physicians, who are the witnesses

of such scenes, say that under ordinary circumstances there is no fear of

the future.  Often, as Plato tells us, death is accompanied 'with

pleasure.'  (Tim.)  When the end is still uncertain, the cry of many a one

has been, 'Pray, that I may be taken.'  The last thoughts even of the best

men depend chiefly on the accidents of their bodily state.  Pain soon

overpowers the desire of life; old age, like the child, is laid to sleep

almost in a moment.  The long experience of life will often destroy the

interest which mankind have in it.  So various are the feelings with which

different persons draw near to death; and still more various the forms in

which imagination clothes it.  For this alternation of feeling compare the

Old Testament,--Psalm vi.; Isaiah; Eccles.



12.  When we think of God and of man in his relation to God; of the

imperfection of our present state and yet of the progress which is

observable in the history of the world and of the human mind; of the depth

and power of our moral ideas which seem to partake of the very nature of

God Himself; when we consider the contrast between the physical laws to

which we are subject and the higher law which raises us above them and is

yet a part of them; when we reflect on our capacity of becoming the

'spectators of all time and all existence,' and of framing in our own minds

the ideal of a perfect Being; when we see how the human mind in all the

higher religions of the world, including Buddhism, notwithstanding some

aberrations, has tended towards such a belief--we have reason to think that

our destiny is different from that of animals; and though we cannot

altogether shut out the childish fear that the soul upon leaving the body

may 'vanish into thin air,' we have still, so far as the nature of the

subject admits, a hope of immortality with which we comfort ourselves on

sufficient grounds.  The denial of the belief takes the heart out of human

life; it lowers men to the level of the material.  As Goethe also says, 'He

is dead even in this world who has no belief in another.'



13.  It is well also that we should sometimes think of the forms of thought

under which the idea of immortality is most naturally presented to us.  It

is clear that to our minds the risen soul can no longer be described, as in

a picture, by the symbol of a creature half-bird, half-human, nor in any

other form of sense.  The multitude of angels, as in Milton, singing the

Almighty 's praises, are a noble image, and may furnish a theme for the

poet or the painter, but they are no longer an adequate expression of the

kingdom of God which is within us.  Neither is there any mansion, in this

world or another, in which the departed can be imagined to dwell and carry

on their occupations.  When this earthly tabernacle is dissolved, no other

habitation or building can take them in:  it is in the language of ideas

only that we speak of them.



First of all there is the thought of rest and freedom from pain; they have

gone home, as the common saying is, and the cares of this world touch them

no more.  Secondly, we may imagine them as they were at their best and

brightest, humbly fulfilling their daily round of duties--selfless,

childlike, unaffected by the world; when the eye was single and the whole

body seemed to be full of light; when the mind was clear and saw into the

purposes of God.  Thirdly, we may think of them as possessed by a great

love of God and man, working out His will at a further stage in the

heavenly pilgrimage.  And yet we acknowledge that these are the things

which eye hath not seen nor ear heard and therefore it hath not entered

into the heart of man in any sensible manner to conceive them.  Fourthly,

there may have been some moments in our own lives when we have risen above

ourselves, or been conscious of our truer selves, in which the will of God

has superseded our wills, and we have entered into communion with Him, and

been partakers for a brief season of the Divine truth and love, in which

like Christ we have been inspired to utter the prayer, 'I in them, and thou

in me, that we may be all made perfect in one.'  These precious moments, if

we have ever known them, are the nearest approach which we can make to the

idea of immortality.



14.  Returning now to the earlier stage of human thought which is

represented by the writings of Plato, we find that many of the same

questions have already arisen:  there is the same tendency to materialism;

the same inconsistency in the application of the idea of mind; the same

doubt whether the soul is to be regarded as a cause or as an effect; the

same falling back on moral convictions.  In the Phaedo the soul is

conscious of her divine nature, and the separation from the body which has

been commenced in this life is perfected in another.  Beginning in mystery,

Socrates, in the intermediate part of the Dialogue, attempts to bring the

doctrine of a future life into connection with his theory of knowledge.  In

proportion as he succeeds in this, the individual seems to disappear in a

more general notion of the soul; the contemplation of ideas 'under the form

of eternity' takes the place of past and future states of existence.  His

language may be compared to that of some modern philosophers, who speak of

eternity, not in the sense of perpetual duration of time, but as an ever-

present quality of the soul.  Yet at the conclusion of the Dialogue, having

'arrived at the end of the intellectual world' (Republic), he replaces the

veil of mythology, and describes the soul and her attendant genius in the

language of the mysteries or of a disciple of Zoroaster.  Nor can we fairly

demand of Plato a consistency which is wanting among ourselves, who

acknowledge that another world is beyond the range of human thought, and

yet are always seeking to represent the mansions of heaven or hell in the

colours of the painter, or in the descriptions of the poet or rhetorician.



15.  The doctrine of the immortality of the soul was not new to the Greeks

in the age of Socrates, but, like the unity of God, had a foundation in the

popular belief.  The old Homeric notion of a gibbering ghost flitting away

to Hades; or of a few illustrious heroes enjoying the isles of the blest;

or of an existence divided between the two; or the Hesiodic, of righteous

spirits, who become guardian angels,--had given place in the mysteries and

the Orphic poets to representations, partly fanciful, of a future state of

rewards and punishments.  (Laws.)  The reticence of the Greeks on public

occasions and in some part of their literature respecting this

'underground' religion, is not to be taken as a measure of the diffusion of

such beliefs.  If Pericles in the funeral oration is silent on the

consolations of immortality, the poet Pindar and the tragedians on the

other hand constantly assume the continued existence of the dead in an

upper or under world.  Darius and Laius are still alive; Antigone will be

dear to her brethren after death; the way to the palace of Cronos is found

by those who 'have thrice departed from evil.'  The tragedy of the Greeks

is not 'rounded' by this life, but is deeply set in decrees of fate and

mysterious workings of powers beneath the earth.  In the caricature of

Aristophanes there is also a witness to the common sentiment.  The Ionian

and Pythagorean philosophies arose, and some new elements were added to the

popular belief.  The individual must find an expression as well as the

world.  Either the soul was supposed to exist in the form of a magnet, or

of a particle of fire, or of light, or air, or water; or of a number or of

a harmony of number; or to be or have, like the stars, a principle of

motion (Arist. de Anim.).  At length Anaxagoras, hardly distinguishing

between life and mind, or between mind human and divine, attained the pure

abstraction; and this, like the other abstractions of Greek philosophy,

sank deep into the human intelligence.  The opposition of the intelligible

and the sensible, and of God to the world, supplied an analogy which

assisted in the separation of soul and body.  If ideas were separable from

phenomena, mind was also separable from matter; if the ideas were eternal,

the mind that conceived them was eternal too.  As the unity of God was more

distinctly acknowledged, the conception of the human soul became more

developed.  The succession, or alternation of life and death, had occurred

to Heracleitus.  The Eleatic Parmenides had stumbled upon the modern

thesis, that 'thought and being are the same.'  The Eastern belief in

transmigration defined the sense of individuality; and some, like

Empedocles, fancied that the blood which they had shed in another state of

being was crying against them, and that for thirty thousand years they were

to be 'fugitives and vagabonds upon the earth.'  The desire of recognizing

a lost mother or love or friend in the world below (Phaedo) was a natural

feeling which, in that age as well as in every other, has given

distinctness to the hope of immortality.  Nor were ethical considerations

wanting, partly derived from the necessity of punishing the greater sort of

criminals, whom no avenging power of this world could reach.  The voice of

conscience, too, was heard reminding the good man that he was not

altogether innocent.  (Republic.)  To these indistinct longings and fears

an expression was given in the mysteries and Orphic poets:  a 'heap of

books' (Republic), passing under the names of Musaeus and Orpheus in

Plato's time, were filled with notions of an under-world.



16.  Yet after all the belief in the individuality of the soul after death

had but a feeble hold on the Greek mind.  Like the personality of God, the

personality of man in a future state was not inseparably bound up with the

reality of his existence.  For the distinction between the personal and

impersonal, and also between the divine and human, was far less marked to

the Greek than to ourselves.  And as Plato readily passes from the notion

of the good to that of God, he also passes almost imperceptibly to himself

and his reader from the future life of the individual soul to the eternal

being of the absolute soul.  There has been a clearer statement and a

clearer denial of the belief in modern times than is found in early Greek

philosophy, and hence the comparative silence on the whole subject which is

often remarked in ancient writers, and particularly in Aristotle.  For

Plato and Aristotle are not further removed in their teaching about the

immortality of the soul than they are in their theory of knowledge.



17.  Living in an age when logic was beginning to mould human thought,

Plato naturally cast his belief in immortality into a logical form.  And

when we consider how much the doctrine of ideas was also one of words, it

is not surprising that he should have fallen into verbal fallacies:  early

logic is always mistaking the truth of the form for the truth of the

matter.  It is easy to see that the alternation of opposites is not the

same as the generation of them out of each other; and that the generation

of them out of each other, which is the first argument in the Phaedo, is at

variance with their mutual exclusion of each other, whether in themselves

or in us, which is the last.  For even if we admit the distinction which he

draws between the opposites and the things which have the opposites, still

individuals fall under the latter class; and we have to pass out of the

region of human hopes and fears to a conception of an abstract soul which

is the impersonation of the ideas.  Such a conception, which in Plato

himself is but half expressed, is unmeaning to us, and relative only to a

particular stage in the history of thought.  The doctrine of reminiscence

is also a fragment of a former world, which has no place in the philosophy

of modern times.  But Plato had the wonders of psychology just opening to

him, and he had not the explanation of them which is supplied by the

analysis of language and the history of the human mind.  The question,

'Whence come our abstract ideas?' he could only answer by an imaginary

hypothesis.  Nor is it difficult to see that his crowning argument is

purely verbal, and is but the expression of an instinctive confidence put

into a logical form:--'The soul is immortal because it contains a principle

of imperishableness.'  Nor does he himself seem at all to be aware that

nothing is added to human knowledge by his 'safe and simple answer,' that

beauty is the cause of the beautiful; and that he is merely reasserting the

Eleatic being 'divided by the Pythagorean numbers,' against the

Heracleitean doctrine of perpetual generation.  The answer to the 'very

serious question' of generation and destruction is really the denial of

them.  For this he would substitute, as in the Republic, a system of ideas,

tested, not by experience, but by their consequences, and not explained by

actual causes, but by a higher, that is, a more general notion. 

Consistency with themselves is the only test which is to be applied to

them.  (Republic, and Phaedo.)



18.  To deal fairly with such arguments, they should be translated as far

as possible into their modern equivalents.  'If the ideas of men are

eternal, their souls are eternal, and if not the ideas, then not the

souls.'  Such an argument stands nearly in the same relation to Plato and

his age, as the argument from the existence of God to immortality among

ourselves.  'If God exists, then the soul exists after death; and if there

is no God, there is no existence of the soul after death.'  For the ideas

are to his mind the reality, the truth, the principle of permanence, as

well as of intelligence and order in the world.  When Simmias and Cebes say

that they are more strongly persuaded of the existence of ideas than they

are of the immortality of the soul, they represent fairly enough the order

of thought in Greek philosophy.  And we might say in the same way that we

are more certain of the existence of God than we are of the immortality of

the soul, and are led by the belief in the one to a belief in the other. 

The parallel, as Socrates would say, is not perfect, but agrees in as far

as the mind in either case is regarded as dependent on something above and

beyond herself.  The analogy may even be pressed a step further:  'We are

more certain of our ideas of truth and right than we are of the existence

of God, and are led on in the order of thought from one to the other.'  Or

more correctly:  'The existence of right and truth is the existence of God,

and can never for a moment be separated from Him.'



19.  The main argument of the Phaedo is derived from the existence of

eternal ideas of which the soul is a partaker; the other argument of the

alternation of opposites is replaced by this.  And there have not been

wanting philosophers of the idealist school who have imagined that the

doctrine of the immortality of the soul is a theory of knowledge, and that

in what has preceded Plato is accommodating himself to the popular belief. 

Such a view can only be elicited from the Phaedo by what may be termed the

transcendental method of interpretation, and is obviously inconsistent with

the Gorgias and the Republic.  Those who maintain it are immediately

compelled to renounce the shadow which they have grasped, as a play of

words only.  But the truth is, that Plato in his argument for the

immortality of the soul has collected many elements of proof or persuasion,

ethical and mythological as well as dialectical, which are not easily to be

reconciled with one another; and he is as much in earnest about his

doctrine of retribution, which is repeated in all his more ethical

writings, as about his theory of knowledge.  And while we may fairly

translate the dialectical into the language of Hegel, and the religious and

mythological into the language of Dante or Bunyan, the ethical speaks to us

still in the same voice, and appeals to a common feeling.



20.  Two arguments of this ethical character occur in the Phaedo.  The

first may be described as the aspiration of the soul after another state of

being.  Like the Oriental or Christian mystic, the philosopher is seeking

to withdraw from impurities of sense, to leave the world and the things of

the world, and to find his higher self.  Plato recognizes in these

aspirations the foretaste of immortality; as Butler and Addison in modern

times have argued, the one from the moral tendencies of mankind, the other

from the progress of the soul towards perfection.  In using this argument

Plato has certainly confused the soul which has left the body, with the

soul of the good and wise.  (Compare Republic.)  Such a confusion was

natural, and arose partly out of the antithesis of soul and body.  The soul

in her own essence, and the soul 'clothed upon' with virtues and graces,

were easily interchanged with one another, because on a subject which

passes expression the distinctions of language can hardly be maintained.



21.  The ethical proof of the immortality of the soul is derived from the

necessity of retribution.  The wicked would be too well off if their evil

deeds came to an end.  It is not to be supposed that an Ardiaeus, an

Archelaus, an Ismenias could ever have suffered the penalty of their crimes

in this world.  The manner in which this retribution is accomplished Plato

represents under the figures of mythology.  Doubtless he felt that it was

easier to improve than to invent, and that in religion especially the

traditional form was required in order to give verisimilitude to the myth.

The myth too is far more probable to that age than to ours, and may fairly

be regarded as 'one guess among many' about the nature of the earth, which

he cleverly supports by the indications of geology.  Not that he insists on

the absolute truth of his own particular notions:  'no man of sense will be

confident in such matters; but he will be confident that something of the

kind is true.'  As in other passages (Gorg., Tim., compare Crito), he wins

belief for his fictions by the moderation of his statements; he does not,

like Dante or Swedenborg, allow himself to be deceived by his own

creations.



The Dialogue must be read in the light of the situation.  And first of all

we are struck by the calmness of the scene.  Like the spectators at the

time, we cannot pity Socrates; his mien and his language are so noble and

fearless.  He is the same that he ever was, but milder and gentler, and he

has in no degree lost his interest in dialectics; he will not forego the

delight of an argument in compliance with the jailer's intimation that he

should not heat himself with talking.  At such a time he naturally

expresses the hope of his life, that he has been a true mystic and not a

mere retainer or wand-bearer:  and he refers to passages of his personal

history.  To his old enemies the Comic poets, and to the proceedings on the

trial, he alludes playfully; but he vividly remembers the disappointment

which he felt in reading the books of Anaxagoras.  The return of Xanthippe

and his children indicates that the philosopher is not 'made of oak or

rock.'  Some other traits of his character may be noted; for example, the

courteous manner in which he inclines his head to the last objector, or the

ironical touch, 'Me already, as the tragic poet would say, the voice of

fate calls;' or the depreciation of the arguments with which 'he comforted

himself and them;' or his fear of 'misology;' or his references to Homer;

or the playful smile with which he 'talks like a book' about greater and

less; or the allusion to the possibility of finding another teacher among

barbarous races (compare Polit.); or the mysterious reference to another

science (mathematics?) of generation and destruction for which he is vainly

feeling.  There is no change in him; only now he is invested with a sort of

sacred character, as the prophet or priest of Apollo the God of the

festival, in whose honour he first of all composes a hymn, and then like

the swan pours forth his dying lay.  Perhaps the extreme elevation of

Socrates above his own situation, and the ordinary interests of life

(compare his jeu d'esprit about his burial, in which for a moment he puts

on the 'Silenus mask'), create in the mind of the reader an impression

stronger than could be derived from arguments that such a one has in him 'a

principle which does not admit of death.'



The other persons of the Dialogue may be considered under two heads: (1)

private friends; (2) the respondents in the argument.



First there is Crito, who has been already introduced to us in the

Euthydemus and the Crito; he is the equal in years of Socrates, and stands

in quite a different relation to him from his younger disciples.  He is a

man of the world who is rich and prosperous (compare the jest in the

Euthydemus), the best friend of Socrates, who wants to know his commands,

in whose presence he talks to his family, and who performs the last duty of

closing his eyes.  It is observable too that, as in the Euthydemus, Crito

shows no aptitude for philosophical discussions.  Nor among the friends of

Socrates must the jailer be forgotten, who seems to have been introduced by

Plato in order to show the impression made by the extraordinary man on the

common.  The gentle nature of the man is indicated by his weeping at the

announcement of his errand and then turning away, and also by the words of

Socrates to his disciples:  'How charming the man is! since I have been in

prison he has been always coming to me, and is as good as could be to me.' 

We are reminded too that he has retained this gentle nature amid scenes of

death and violence by the contrasts which he draws between the behaviour of

Socrates and of others when about to die.



Another person who takes no part in the philosophical discussion is the

excitable Apollodorus, the same who, in the Symposium, of which he is the

narrator, is called 'the madman,' and who testifies his grief by the most

violent emotions.  Phaedo is also present, the 'beloved disciple' as he may

be termed, who is described, if not 'leaning on his bosom,' as seated next

to Socrates, who is playing with his hair.  He too, like Apollodorus, takes

no part in the discussion, but he loves above all things to hear and speak

of Socrates after his death.  The calmness of his behaviour, veiling his

face when he can no longer restrain his tears, contrasts with the

passionate outcries of the other.  At a particular point the argument is

described as falling before the attack of Simmias.  A sort of despair is

introduced in the minds of the company.  The effect of this is heightened

by the description of Phaedo, who has been the eye-witness of the scene,

and by the sympathy of his Phliasian auditors who are beginning to think

'that they too can never trust an argument again.'  And the intense

interest of the company is communicated not only to the first auditors, but

to us who in a distant country read the narrative of their emotions after

more than two thousand years have passed away.



The two principal interlocutors are Simmias and Cebes, the disciples of

Philolaus the Pythagorean philosopher of Thebes.  Simmias is described in

the Phaedrus as fonder of an argument than any man living; and Cebes,

although finally persuaded by Socrates, is said to be the most incredulous

of human beings.  It is Cebes who at the commencement of the Dialogue asks

why 'suicide is held to be unlawful,' and who first supplies the doctrine

of recollection in confirmation of the pre-existence of the soul.  It is

Cebes who urges that the pre-existence does not necessarily involve the

future existence of the soul, as is shown by the illustration of the weaver

and his coat.  Simmias, on the other hand, raises the question about

harmony and the lyre, which is naturally put into the mouth of a

Pythagorean disciple.  It is Simmias, too, who first remarks on the

uncertainty of human knowledge, and only at last concedes to the argument

such a qualified approval as is consistent with the feebleness of the human

faculties.  Cebes is the deeper and more consecutive thinker, Simmias more

superficial and rhetorical; they are distinguished in much the same manner

as Adeimantus and Glaucon in the Republic.



Other persons, Menexenus, Ctesippus, Lysis, are old friends; Evenus has

been already satirized in the Apology; Aeschines and Epigenes were present

at the trial; Euclid and Terpsion will reappear in the Introduction to the

Theaetetus, Hermogenes has already appeared in the Cratylus.  No inference

can fairly be drawn from the absence of Aristippus, nor from the omission

of Xenophon, who at the time of Socrates' death was in Asia.  The mention

of Plato's own absence seems like an expression of sorrow, and may,

perhaps, be an indication that the report of the conversation is not to be

taken literally.



The place of the Dialogue in the series is doubtful.  The doctrine of ideas

is certainly carried beyond the Socratic point of view; in no other of the

writings of Plato is the theory of them so completely developed.  Whether

the belief in immortality can be attributed to Socrates or not is

uncertain; the silence of the Memorabilia, and of the earlier Dialogues of

Plato, is an argument to the contrary.  Yet in the Cyropaedia Xenophon has

put language into the mouth of the dying Cyrus which recalls the Phaedo,

and may have been derived from the teaching of Socrates.  It may be fairly

urged that the greatest religious interest of mankind could not have been

wholly ignored by one who passed his life in fulfilling the commands of an

oracle, and who recognized a Divine plan in man and nature.  (Xen. Mem.) 

And the language of the Apology and of the Crito confirms this view.



The Phaedo is not one of the Socratic Dialogues of Plato; nor, on the other

hand, can it be assigned to that later stage of the Platonic writings at

which the doctrine of ideas appears to be forgotten.  It belongs rather to

the intermediate period of the Platonic philosophy, which roughly

corresponds to the Phaedrus, Gorgias, Republic, Theaetetus.  Without

pretending to determine the real time of their composition, the Symposium,

Meno, Euthyphro, Apology, Phaedo may be conveniently read by us in this

order as illustrative of the life of Socrates.  Another chain may be formed

of the Meno, Phaedrus, Phaedo, in which the immortality of the soul is

connected with the doctrine of ideas.  In the Meno the theory of ideas is

based on the ancient belief in transmigration, which reappears again in the

Phaedrus as well as in the Republic and Timaeus, and in all of them is

connected with a doctrine of retribution.  In the Phaedrus the immortality

of the soul is supposed to rest on the conception of the soul as a

principle of motion, whereas in the Republic the argument turns on the

natural continuance of the soul, which, if not destroyed by her own proper

evil, can hardly be destroyed by any other.  The soul of man in the Timaeus

is derived from the Supreme Creator, and either returns after death to her

kindred star, or descends into the lower life of an animal.  The Apology

expresses the same view as the Phaedo, but with less confidence; there the

probability of death being a long sleep is not excluded.  The Theaetetus

also describes, in a digression, the desire of the soul to fly away and be

with God--'and to fly to him is to be like him.'  The Symposium may be

observed to resemble as well as to differ from the Phaedo.  While the first

notion of immortality is only in the way of natural procreation or of

posthumous fame and glory, the higher revelation of beauty, like the good

in the Republic, is the vision of the eternal idea.  So deeply rooted in

Plato's mind is the belief in immortality; so various are the forms of

expression which he employs.



As in several other Dialogues, there is more of system in the Phaedo than

appears at first sight.  The succession of arguments is based on previous

philosophies; beginning with the mysteries and the Heracleitean alternation

of opposites, and proceeding to the Pythagorean harmony and transmigration;

making a step by the aid of Platonic reminiscence, and a further step by

the help of the nous of Anaxagoras; until at last we rest in the conviction

that the soul is inseparable from the ideas, and belongs to the world of

the invisible and unknown.  Then, as in the Gorgias or Republic, the

curtain falls, and the veil of mythology descends upon the argument.  After

the confession of Socrates that he is an interested party, and the

acknowledgment that no man of sense will think the details of his narrative

true, but that something of the kind is true, we return from speculation to

practice.  He is himself more confident of immortality than he is of his

own arguments; and the confidence which he expresses is less strong than

that which his cheerfulness and composure in death inspire in us.



Difficulties of two kinds occur in the Phaedo--one kind to be explained out

of contemporary philosophy, the other not admitting of an entire solution.

(1) The difficulty which Socrates says that he experienced in explaining

generation and corruption; the assumption of hypotheses which proceed from

the less general to the more general, and are tested by their consequences;

the puzzle about greater and less; the resort to the method of ideas, which

to us appear only abstract terms,--these are to be explained out of the

position of Socrates and Plato in the history of philosophy.  They were

living in a twilight between the sensible and the intellectual world, and

saw no way of connecting them.  They could neither explain the relation of

ideas to phenomena, nor their correlation to one another.  The very idea of

relation or comparison was embarrassing to them.  Yet in this intellectual

uncertainty they had a conception of a proof from results, and of a moral

truth, which remained unshaken amid the questionings of philosophy.  (2)

The other is a difficulty which is touched upon in the Republic as well as

in the Phaedo, and is common to modern and ancient philosophy.  Plato is

not altogether satisfied with his safe and simple method of ideas.  He

wants to have proved to him by facts that all things are for the best, and

that there is one mind or design which pervades them all.  But this 'power

of the best' he is unable to explain; and therefore takes refuge in

universal ideas.  And are not we at this day seeking to discover that which

Socrates in a glass darkly foresaw?



Some resemblances to the Greek drama may be noted in all the Dialogues of

Plato.  The Phaedo is the tragedy of which Socrates is the protagonist and

Simmias and Cebes the secondary performers, standing to them in the same

relation as to Glaucon and Adeimantus in the Republic.  No Dialogue has a

greater unity of subject and feeling.  Plato has certainly fulfilled the

condition of Greek, or rather of all art, which requires that scenes of

death and suffering should be clothed in beauty.  The gathering of the

friends at the commencement of the Dialogue, the dismissal of Xanthippe,

whose presence would have been out of place at a philosophical discussion,

but who returns again with her children to take a final farewell, the

dejection of the audience at the temporary overthrow of the argument, the

picture of Socrates playing with the hair of Phaedo, the final scene in

which Socrates alone retains his composure--are masterpieces of art.  And

the chorus at the end might have interpreted the feeling of the play: 

'There can no evil happen to a good man in life or death.'



'The art of concealing art' is nowhere more perfect than in those writings

of Plato which describe the trial and death of Socrates.  Their charm is

their simplicity, which gives them verisimilitude; and yet they touch, as

if incidentally, and because they were suitable to the occasion, on some of

the deepest truths of philosophy.  There is nothing in any tragedy, ancient

or modern, nothing in poetry or history (with one exception), like the last

hours of Socrates in Plato.  The master could not be more fitly occupied at

such a time than in discoursing of immortality; nor the disciples more

divinely consoled.  The arguments, taken in the spirit and not in the

letter, are our arguments; and Socrates by anticipation may be even thought

to refute some 'eccentric notions; current in our own age.  For there are

philosophers among ourselves who do not seem to understand how much

stronger is the power of intelligence, or of the best, than of Atlas, or

mechanical force.  How far the words attributed to Socrates were actually

uttered by him we forbear to ask; for no answer can be given to this

question.  And it is better to resign ourselves to the feeling of a great

work, than to linger among critical uncertainties.





PHAEDO



by



Plato



Translated by Benjamin Jowett.





PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:

Phaedo, who is the narrator of the dialogue to Echecrates of Phlius.

Socrates, Apollodorus, Simmias, Cebes, Crito and an Attendant of the

Prison.



SCENE:  The Prison of Socrates.



PLACE OF THE NARRATION:  Phlius.





ECHECRATES:  Were you yourself, Phaedo, in the prison with Socrates on the

day when he drank the poison?



PHAEDO:  Yes, Echecrates, I was.



ECHECRATES:  I should so like to hear about his death.  What did he say in

his last hours?  We were informed that he died by taking poison, but no one

knew anything more; for no Phliasian ever goes to Athens now, and it is a

long time since any stranger from Athens has found his way hither; so that

we had no clear account.



PHAEDO:  Did you not hear of the proceedings at the trial?



ECHECRATES:  Yes; some one told us about the trial, and we could not

understand why, having been condemned, he should have been put to death,

not at the time, but long afterwards.  What was the reason of this?



PHAEDO:  An accident, Echecrates:  the stern of the ship which the

Athenians send to Delos happened to have been crowned on the day before he

was tried.



ECHECRATES:  What is this ship?



PHAEDO:  It is the ship in which, according to Athenian tradition, Theseus

went to Crete when he took with him the fourteen youths, and was the

saviour of them and of himself.  And they were said to have vowed to Apollo

at the time, that if they were saved they would send a yearly mission to

Delos.  Now this custom still continues, and the whole period of the voyage

to and from Delos, beginning when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of

the ship, is a holy season, during which the city is not allowed to be

polluted by public executions; and when the vessel is detained by contrary

winds, the time spent in going and returning is very considerable.  As I

was saying, the ship was crowned on the day before the trial, and this was

the reason why Socrates lay in prison and was not put to death until long

after he was condemned.



ECHECRATES:  What was the manner of his death, Phaedo?  What was said or

done?  And which of his friends were with him?  Or did the authorities

forbid them to be present--so that he had no friends near him when he died?



PHAEDO:  No; there were several of them with him.



ECHECRATES:  If you have nothing to do, I wish that you would tell me what

passed, as exactly as you can.



PHAEDO:  I have nothing at all to do, and will try to gratify your wish. 

To be reminded of Socrates is always the greatest delight to me, whether I

speak myself or hear another speak of him.



ECHECRATES:  You will have listeners who are of the same mind with you, and

I hope that you will be as exact as you can.



PHAEDO:  I had a singular feeling at being in his company.  For I could

hardly believe that I was present at the death of a friend, and therefore I

did not pity him, Echecrates; he died so fearlessly, and his words and

bearing were so noble and gracious, that to me he appeared blessed.  I

thought that in going to the other world he could not be without a divine

call, and that he would be happy, if any man ever was, when he arrived

there, and therefore I did not pity him as might have seemed natural at

such an hour.  But I had not the pleasure which I usually feel in

philosophical discourse (for philosophy was the theme of which we spoke). 

I was pleased, but in the pleasure there was also a strange admixture of

pain; for I reflected that he was soon to die, and this double feeling was

shared by us all; we were laughing and weeping by turns, especially the

excitable Apollodorus--you know the sort of man?



ECHECRATES:  Yes.



PHAEDO:  He was quite beside himself; and I and all of us were greatly

moved.



ECHECRATES:  Who were present?



PHAEDO:  Of native Athenians there were, besides Apollodorus, Critobulus

and his father Crito, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, Antisthenes;

likewise Ctesippus of the deme of Paeania, Menexenus, and some others;

Plato, if I am not mistaken, was ill.



ECHECRATES:  Were there any strangers?



PHAEDO:  Yes, there were; Simmias the Theban, and Cebes, and Phaedondes;

Euclid and Terpison, who came from Megara.



ECHECRATES:  And was Aristippus there, and Cleombrotus?



PHAEDO:  No, they were said to be in Aegina.



ECHECRATES:  Any one else?



PHAEDO:  I think that these were nearly all.



ECHECRATES:  Well, and what did you talk about?



PHAEDO:  I will begin at the beginning, and endeavour to repeat the entire

conversation.  On the previous days we had been in the habit of assembling

early in the morning at the court in which the trial took place, and which

is not far from the prison.  There we used to wait talking with one another

until the opening of the doors (for they were not opened very early); then

we went in and generally passed the day with Socrates.  On the last morning

we assembled sooner than usual, having heard on the day before when we

quitted the prison in the evening that the sacred ship had come from Delos,

and so we arranged to meet very early at the accustomed place.  On our

arrival the jailer who answered the door, instead of admitting us, came out

and told us to stay until he called us.  'For the Eleven,' he said, 'are

now with Socrates; they are taking off his chains, and giving orders that

he is to die to-day.'  He soon returned and said that we might come in.  On

entering we found Socrates just released from chains, and Xanthippe, whom

you know, sitting by him, and holding his child in her arms.  When she saw

us she uttered a cry and said, as women will:  'O Socrates, this is the

last time that either you will converse with your friends, or they with

you.'  Socrates turned to Crito and said:  'Crito, let some one take her

home.'  Some of Crito's people accordingly led her away, crying out and

beating herself.  And when she was gone, Socrates, sitting up on the couch,

bent and rubbed his leg, saying, as he was rubbing:  How singular is the

thing called pleasure, and how curiously related to pain, which might be

thought to be the opposite of it; for they are never present to a man at

the same instant, and yet he who pursues either is generally compelled to

take the other; their bodies are two, but they are joined by a single head. 

And I cannot help thinking that if Aesop had remembered them, he would have

made a fable about God trying to reconcile their strife, and how, when he

could not, he fastened their heads together; and this is the reason why

when one comes the other follows, as I know by my own experience now, when

after the pain in my leg which was caused by the chain pleasure appears to

succeed.



Upon this Cebes said:  I am glad, Socrates, that you have mentioned the

name of Aesop.  For it reminds me of a question which has been asked by

many, and was asked of me only the day before yesterday by Evenus the poet

--he will be sure to ask it again, and therefore if you would like me to

have an answer ready for him, you may as well tell me what I should say to

him:--he wanted to know why you, who never before wrote a line of poetry,

now that you are in prison are turning Aesop's fables into verse, and also

composing that hymn in honour of Apollo.



Tell him, Cebes, he replied, what is the truth--that I had no idea of

rivalling him or his poems; to do so, as I knew, would be no easy task. 

But I wanted to see whether I could purge away a scruple which I felt about

the meaning of certain dreams.  In the course of my life I have often had

intimations in dreams 'that I should compose music.'  The same dream came

to me sometimes in one form, and sometimes in another, but always saying

the same or nearly the same words:  'Cultivate and make music,' said the

dream.  And hitherto I had imagined that this was only intended to exhort

and encourage me in the study of philosophy, which has been the pursuit of

my life, and is the noblest and best of music.  The dream was bidding me do

what I was already doing, in the same way that the competitor in a race is

bidden by the spectators to run when he is already running.  But I was not

certain of this, for the dream might have meant music in the popular sense

of the word, and being under sentence of death, and the festival giving me

a respite, I thought that it would be safer for me to satisfy the scruple,

and, in obedience to the dream, to compose a few verses before I departed. 

And first I made a hymn in honour of the god of the festival, and then

considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet, should not only put

together words, but should invent stories, and that I have no invention, I

took some fables of Aesop, which I had ready at hand and which I knew--they

were the first I came upon--and turned them into verse.  Tell this to

Evenus, Cebes, and bid him be of good cheer; say that I would have him come

after me if he be a wise man, and not tarry; and that to-day I am likely to

be going, for the Athenians say that I must.



Simmias said:  What a message for such a man! having been a frequent

companion of his I should say that, as far as I know him, he will never

take your advice unless he is obliged.



Why, said Socrates,--is not Evenus a philosopher?



I think that he is, said Simmias.



Then he, or any man who has the spirit of philosophy, will be willing to

die, but he will not take his own life, for that is held to be unlawful.



Here he changed his position, and put his legs off the couch on to the

ground, and during the rest of the conversation he remained sitting.



Why do you say, enquired Cebes, that a man ought not to take his own life,

but that the philosopher will be ready to follow the dying?



Socrates replied:  And have you, Cebes and Simmias, who are the disciples

of Philolaus, never heard him speak of this?



Yes, but his language was obscure, Socrates.



My words, too, are only an echo; but there is no reason why I should not

repeat what I have heard:  and indeed, as I am going to another place, it

is very meet for me to be thinking and talking of the nature of the

pilgrimage which I am about to make.  What can I do better in the interval

between this and the setting of the sun?



Then tell me, Socrates, why is suicide held to be unlawful? as I have

certainly heard Philolaus, about whom you were just now asking, affirm when

he was staying with us at Thebes:  and there are others who say the same,

although I have never understood what was meant by any of them.



Do not lose heart, replied Socrates, and the day may come when you will

understand.  I suppose that you wonder why, when other things which are

evil may be good at certain times and to certain persons, death is to be

the only exception, and why, when a man is better dead, he is not permitted

to be his own benefactor, but must wait for the hand of another.



Very true, said Cebes, laughing gently and speaking in his native Boeotian.



I admit the appearance of inconsistency in what I am saying; but there may

not be any real inconsistency after all.  There is a doctrine whispered in

secret that man is a prisoner who has no right to open the door and run

away; this is a great mystery which I do not quite understand.  Yet I too

believe that the gods are our guardians, and that we are a possession of

theirs.  Do you not agree?



Yes, I quite agree, said Cebes.



And if one of your own possessions, an ox or an ass, for example, took the

liberty of putting himself out of the way when you had given no intimation

of your wish that he should die, would you not be angry with him, and would

you not punish him if you could?



Certainly, replied Cebes.



Then, if we look at the matter thus, there may be reason in saying that a

man should wait, and not take his own life until God summons him, as he is

now summoning me.



Yes, Socrates, said Cebes, there seems to be truth in what you say.  And

yet how can you reconcile this seemingly true belief that God is our

guardian and we his possessions, with the willingness to die which we were

just now attributing to the philosopher?  That the wisest of men should be

willing to leave a service in which they are ruled by the gods who are the

best of rulers, is not reasonable; for surely no wise man thinks that when

set at liberty he can take better care of himself than the gods take of

him.  A fool may perhaps think so--he may argue that he had better run away

from his master, not considering that his duty is to remain to the end, and

not to run away from the good, and that there would be no sense in his

running away.  The wise man will want to be ever with him who is better

than himself.  Now this, Socrates, is the reverse of what was just now

said; for upon this view the wise man should sorrow and the fool rejoice at

passing out of life.



The earnestness of Cebes seemed to please Socrates.  Here, said he, turning

to us, is a man who is always inquiring, and is not so easily convinced by

the first thing which he hears.



And certainly, added Simmias, the objection which he is now making does

appear to me to have some force.  For what can be the meaning of a truly

wise man wanting to fly away and lightly leave a master who is better than

himself?  And I rather imagine that Cebes is referring to you; he thinks

that you are too ready to leave us, and too ready to leave the gods whom

you acknowledge to be our good masters.



Yes, replied Socrates; there is reason in what you say.  And so you think

that I ought to answer your indictment as if I were in a court?



We should like you to do so, said Simmias.



Then I must try to make a more successful defence before you than I did

when before the judges.  For I am quite ready to admit, Simmias and Cebes,

that I ought to be grieved at death, if I were not persuaded in the first

place that I am going to other gods who are wise and good (of which I am as

certain as I can be of any such matters), and secondly (though I am not so

sure of this last) to men departed, better than those whom I leave behind;

and therefore I do not grieve as I might have done, for I have good hope

that there is yet something remaining for the dead, and as has been said of

old, some far better thing for the good than for the evil.



But do you mean to take away your thoughts with you, Socrates? said

Simmias.  Will you not impart them to us?--for they are a benefit in which

we too are entitled to share.  Moreover, if you succeed in convincing us,

that will be an answer to the charge against yourself.



I will do my best, replied Socrates.  But you must first let me hear what

Crito wants; he has long been wishing to say something to me.



Only this, Socrates, replied Crito:--the attendant who is to give you the

poison has been telling me, and he wants me to tell you, that you are not

to talk much, talking, he says, increases heat, and this is apt to

interfere with the action of the poison; persons who excite themselves are

sometimes obliged to take a second or even a third dose.



Then, said Socrates, let him mind his business and be prepared to give the

poison twice or even thrice if necessary; that is all.



I knew quite well what you would say, replied Crito; but I was obliged to

satisfy him.



Never mind him, he said.



And now, O my judges, I desire to prove to you that the real philosopher

has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die, and that after

death he may hope to obtain the greatest good in the other world.  And how

this may be, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavour to explain.  For I deem

that the true votary of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood by other

men; they do not perceive that he is always pursuing death and dying; and

if this be so, and he has had the desire of death all his life long, why

when his time comes should he repine at that which he has been always

pursuing and desiring?



Simmias said laughingly:  Though not in a laughing humour, you have made me

laugh, Socrates; for I cannot help thinking that the many when they hear

your words will say how truly you have described philosophers, and our

people at home will likewise say that the life which philosophers desire is

in reality death, and that they have found them out to be deserving of the

death which they desire.



And they are right, Simmias, in thinking so, with the exception of the

words 'they have found them out'; for they have not found out either what

is the nature of that death which the true philosopher deserves, or how he

deserves or desires death.  But enough of them:--let us discuss the matter

among ourselves:  Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?



To be sure, replied Simmias.



Is it not the separation of soul and body?  And to be dead is the

completion of this; when the soul exists in herself, and is released from

the body and the body is released from the soul, what is this but death?



Just so, he replied.



There is another question, which will probably throw light on our present

inquiry if you and I can agree about it:--Ought the philosopher to care

about the pleasures--if they are to be called pleasures--of eating and

drinking?



Certainly not, answered Simmias.



And what about the pleasures of love--should he care for them?



By no means.



And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the body, for

example, the acquisition of costly raiment, or sandals, or other adornments

of the body?  Instead of caring about them, does he not rather despise

anything more than nature needs?  What do you say?



I should say that the true philosopher would despise them.



Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not with

the body?  He would like, as far as he can, to get away from the body and

to turn to the soul.



Quite true.



In matters of this sort philosophers, above all other men, may be observed

in every sort of way to dissever the soul from the communion of the body.



Very true.



Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that to him who has

no sense of pleasure and no part in bodily pleasure, life is not worth

having; and that he who is indifferent about them is as good as dead.



That is also true.



What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?--is the

body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper?  I mean

to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them?  Are they not, as the

poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet, if even they

are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses?--for

you will allow that they are the best of them?



Certainly, he replied.



Then when does the soul attain truth?--for in attempting to consider

anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived.



True.



Then must not true existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all?



Yes.



And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of

these things trouble her--neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any

pleasure,--when she takes leave of the body, and has as little as possible

to do with it, when she has no bodily sense or desire, but is aspiring

after true being?



Certainly.



And in this the philosopher dishonours the body; his soul runs away from

his body and desires to be alone and by herself?



That is true.



Well, but there is another thing, Simmias:  Is there or is there not an

absolute justice?



Assuredly there is.



And an absolute beauty and absolute good?



Of course.



But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes?



Certainly not.



Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense?--and I speak not of

these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and of

the essence or true nature of everything.  Has the reality of them ever

been perceived by you through the bodily organs? or rather, is not the

nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him who

so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of

the essence of each thing which he considers?



Certainly.



And he attains to the purest knowledge of them who goes to each with the

mind alone, not introducing or intruding in the act of thought sight or any

other sense together with reason, but with the very light of the mind in

her own clearness searches into the very truth of each; he who has got rid,

as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the whole body,

these being in his opinion distracting elements which when they infect the

soul hinder her from acquiring truth and knowledge--who, if not he, is

likely to attain the knowledge of true being?



What you say has a wonderful truth in it, Socrates, replied Simmias.



And when real philosophers consider all these things, will they not be led

to make a reflection which they will express in words something like the

following?  'Have we not found,' they will say, 'a path of thought which

seems to bring us and our argument to the conclusion, that while we are in

the body, and while the soul is infected with the evils of the body, our

desire will not be satisfied? and our desire is of the truth.  For the body

is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of

food; and is liable also to diseases which overtake and impede us in the

search after true being:  it fills us full of loves, and lusts, and fears,

and fancies of all kinds, and endless foolery, and in fact, as men say,

takes away from us the power of thinking at all.  Whence come wars, and

fightings, and factions? whence but from the body and the lusts of the

body?  wars are occasioned by the love of money, and money has to be

acquired for the sake and in the service of the body; and by reason of all

these impediments we have no time to give to philosophy; and, last and

worst of all, even if we are at leisure and betake ourselves to some

speculation, the body is always breaking in upon us, causing turmoil and

confusion in our enquiries, and so amazing us that we are prevented from

seeing the truth.  It has been proved to us by experience that if we would

have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body--the soul in

herself must behold things in themselves:  and then we shall attain the

wisdom which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers, not while

we live, but after death; for if while in company with the body, the soul

cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things follows--either knowledge is

not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death.  For then, and not

till then, the soul will be parted from the body and exist in herself

alone.  In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to

knowledge when we have the least possible intercourse or communion with the

body, and are not surfeited with the bodily nature, but keep ourselves pure

until the hour when God himself is pleased to release us.  And thus having

got rid of the foolishness of the body we shall be pure and hold converse

with the pure, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere, which is

no other than the light of truth.'  For the impure are not permitted to

approach the pure.  These are the sort of words, Simmias, which the true

lovers of knowledge cannot help saying to one another, and thinking.  You

would agree; would you not?



Undoubtedly, Socrates.



But, O my friend, if this is true, there is great reason to hope that,

going whither I go, when I have come to the end of my journey, I shall

attain that which has been the pursuit of my life.  And therefore I go on

my way rejoicing, and not I only, but every other man who believes that his

mind has been made ready and that he is in a manner purified.



Certainly, replied Simmias.



And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, as I

was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself

into herself from all sides out of the body; the dwelling in her own place

alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can;--the release

of the soul from the chains of the body?



Very true, he said.



And this separation and release of the soul from the body is termed death?



To be sure, he said.



And the true philosophers, and they only, are ever seeking to release the

soul.  Is not the separation and release of the soul from the body their

especial study?



That is true.



And, as I was saying at first, there would be a ridiculous contradiction in

men studying to live as nearly as they can in a state of death, and yet

repining when it comes upon them.



Clearly.



And the true philosophers, Simmias, are always occupied in the practice of

dying, wherefore also to them least of all men is death terrible.  Look at

the matter thus:--if they have been in every way the enemies of the body,

and are wanting to be alone with the soul, when this desire of theirs is

granted, how inconsistent would they be if they trembled and repined,

instead of rejoicing at their departure to that place where, when they

arrive, they hope to gain that which in life they desired--and this was

wisdom--and at the same time to be rid of the company of their enemy.  Many

a man has been willing to go to the world below animated by the hope of

seeing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing with them. 

And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and is strongly persuaded in

like manner that only in the world below he can worthily enjoy her, still

repine at death?  Will he not depart with joy?  Surely he will, O my

friend, if he be a true philosopher.  For he will have a firm conviction

that there and there only, he can find wisdom in her purity.  And if this

be true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, if he were afraid of

death.



He would, indeed, replied Simmias.



And when you see a man who is repining at the approach of death, is not his

reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not a lover of wisdom, but a lover

of the body, and probably at the same time a lover of either money or

power, or both?



Quite so, he replied.



And is not courage, Simmias, a quality which is specially characteristic of

the philosopher?



Certainly.



There is temperance again, which even by the vulgar is supposed to consist

in the control and regulation of the passions, and in the sense of

superiority to them--is not temperance a virtue belonging to those only who

despise the body, and who pass their lives in philosophy?



Most assuredly.



For the courage and temperance of other men, if you will consider them, are

really a contradiction.



How so?



Well, he said, you are aware that death is regarded by men in general as a

great evil.



Very true, he said.



And do not courageous men face death because they are afraid of yet greater

evils?



That is quite true.



Then all but the philosophers are courageous only from fear, and because

they are afraid; and yet that a man should be courageous from fear, and

because he is a coward, is surely a strange thing.



Very true.



And are not the temperate exactly in the same case?  They are temperate

because they are intemperate--which might seem to be a contradiction, but

is nevertheless the sort of thing which happens with this foolish

temperance.  For there are pleasures which they are afraid of losing; and

in their desire to keep them, they abstain from some pleasures, because

they are overcome by others; and although to be conquered by pleasure is

called by men intemperance, to them the conquest of pleasure consists in

being conquered by pleasure.  And that is what I mean by saying that, in a

sense, they are made temperate through intemperance.



Such appears to be the case.



Yet the exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain for another fear or

pleasure or pain, and of the greater for the less, as if they were coins,

is not the exchange of virtue.  O my blessed Simmias, is there not one true

coin for which all things ought to be exchanged?--and that is wisdom; and

only in exchange for this, and in company with this, is anything truly

bought or sold, whether courage or temperance or justice.  And is not all

true virtue the companion of wisdom, no matter what fears or pleasures or

other similar goods or evils may or may not attend her?  But the virtue

which is made up of these goods, when they are severed from wisdom and

exchanged with one another, is a shadow of virtue only, nor is there any

freedom or health or truth in her; but in the true exchange there is a

purging away of all these things, and temperance, and justice, and courage,

and wisdom herself are the purgation of them.  The founders of the

mysteries would appear to have had a real meaning, and were not talking

nonsense when they intimated in a figure long ago that he who passes

unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will lie in a slough, but

that he who arrives there after initiation and purification will dwell with

the gods.  For 'many,' as they say in the mysteries, 'are the thyrsus-

bearers, but few are the mystics,'--meaning, as I interpret the words, 'the

true philosophers.'  In the number of whom, during my whole life, I have

been seeking, according to my ability, to find a place;--whether I have

sought in a right way or not, and whether I have succeeded or not, I shall

truly know in a little while, if God will, when I myself arrive in the

other world--such is my belief.  And therefore I maintain that I am right,

Simmias and Cebes, in not grieving or repining at parting from you and my

masters in this world, for I believe that I shall equally find good masters

and friends in another world.  But most men do not believe this saying; if

then I succeed in convincing you by my defence better than I did the

Athenian judges, it will be well.



Cebes answered:  I agree, Socrates, in the greater part of what you say. 

But in what concerns the soul, men are apt to be incredulous; they fear

that when she has left the body her place may be nowhere, and that on the

very day of death she may perish and come to an end--immediately on her

release from the body, issuing forth dispersed like smoke or air and in her

flight vanishing away into nothingness.  If she could only be collected

into herself after she has obtained release from the evils of which you are

speaking, there would be good reason to hope, Socrates, that what you say

is true.  But surely it requires a great deal of argument and many proofs

to show that when the man is dead his soul yet exists, and has any force or

intelligence.



True, Cebes, said Socrates; and shall I suggest that we converse a little

of the probabilities of these things?



I am sure, said Cebes, that I should greatly like to know your opinion

about them.



I reckon, said Socrates, that no one who heard me now, not even if he were

one of my old enemies, the Comic poets, could accuse me of idle talking

about matters in which I have no concern:--If you please, then, we will

proceed with the inquiry.



Suppose we consider the question whether the souls of men after death are

or are not in the world below.  There comes into my mind an ancient

doctrine which affirms that they go from hence into the other world, and

returning hither, are born again from the dead.  Now if it be true that the

living come from the dead, then our souls must exist in the other world,

for if not, how could they have been born again?  And this would be

conclusive, if there were any real evidence that the living are only born

from the dead; but if this is not so, then other arguments will have to be

adduced.



Very true, replied Cebes.



Then let us consider the whole question, not in relation to man only, but

in relation to animals generally, and to plants, and to everything of which

there is generation, and the proof will be easier.  Are not all things

which have opposites generated out of their opposites?  I mean such things

as good and evil, just and unjust--and there are innumerable other

opposites which are generated out of opposites.  And I want to show that in

all opposites there is of necessity a similar alternation; I mean to say,

for example, that anything which becomes greater must become greater after

being less.



True.



And that which becomes less must have been once greater and then have

become less.



Yes.



And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the

slower.



Very true.



And the worse is from the better, and the more just is from the more

unjust.



Of course.



And is this true of all opposites? and are we convinced that all of them

are generated out of opposites?



Yes.



And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not also two

intermediate processes which are ever going on, from one to the other

opposite, and back again; where there is a greater and a less there is also

an intermediate process of increase and diminution, and that which grows is

said to wax, and that which decays to wane?



Yes, he said.



And there are many other processes, such as division and composition,

cooling and heating, which equally involve a passage into and out of one

another.  And this necessarily holds of all opposites, even though not

always expressed in words--they are really generated out of one another,

and there is a passing or process from one to the other of them?



Very true, he replied.



Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the opposite of

waking?



True, he said.



And what is it?



Death, he answered.



And these, if they are opposites, are generated the one from the other, and

have there their two intermediate processes also?



Of course.



Now, said Socrates, I will analyze one of the two pairs of opposites which

I have mentioned to you, and also its intermediate processes, and you shall

analyze the other to me.  One of them I t